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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Many  companies  continue  to  go  public  with  takeover  defenses  even  though 
institutional investors zealously oppose defenses in public companies. In this Article, I 
analyze the determinants of takeover defenses at IPO firms using an empirical analysis of 
259 IPOs from 2008-12, interviews with numerous practitioners, and a survey of the 
corporate governance policies of significant investors. I find that the type of an issuer’s 
legal counsel’s M&A experience and the identity of pre-IPO shareholders explain much 
of the variation in takeover defenses at IPO firms. Companies advised by law firms with 
more target-side M&A experience adopt more defenses, while companies advised by law 
firms with more acquirer-side M&A experience adopt fewer defenses. Companies backed 
by venture capital funds are significantly more likely to adopt more takeover defenses. 
However,  private  equity  backing  has  no  effect  on  the  pre-IPO  adoption  of  staggered 
boards. Even though mutual funds and public pension funds are some of the most ardent 
opponents of takeover defenses in public companies, I find that issuers that they had 
invested in prior to the IPO almost always go public with robust takeover defenses in 
place. A comparison of issuers backed by Silicon Valley law firm Wilson Sonsini and 
New York law firm Simpson Thacher is particularly telling: Wilson Sonsini, a firm well 
known for its ties to the venture capital industry and its representation of targets, installed 
staggered boards in all of its IPO clients while Simpson Thacher, known for its private 
equity practice and acquirer representation, installed staggered boards in only 50% of its 
IPO clients. The lack of a consensus regarding the efficiency of defenses among the most 
experienced  participants  in  the  IPO  market  leads  me  to  reject  the  idea  that  takeover 
defenses are generally optimal for pre-IPO shareholders. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION   
 
Over thirty years after the poison pill was first invented, the fight over takeover 
defenses  still  figures  prominently  in  public  discourse  on  corporate  governance  and 
shareholder rights.
† While courts have generally decided in favor of boards,
‡ shareholder 
activists have been extremely successful at the ballot box.
§ Over the past decade, virtually 
every major mutual fund and public pension fund has come out in opposition to takeover 
defenses  such  as  staggered  boards  in  public  companies.  This  public  pressure,  often 
expressed through shareholder proposals, has resulted in a massive trend towards board 
declassification in public companies. 
  Despite all of this public opposition to certain takeover defenses, a majority of 
companies  continue  to  go  public  with s t a ggered  boards  in  place.  In  this  Article,  I 
investigate the determinants of whether or not companies have takeover defenses such as 
an effective staggered board in place at the time of their initial public offerings. First, I 
describe and examine various law firm hypotheses. I test the hypothesis that the quality 
of  legal  services—as  measured  by  a  law  firm’s  overall  experience  in  public  M&A 
transactions—provided  to  pre-IPO  manager-shareholders  explains  the  variation  in  the 
adoption of takeover defenses at the IPO. Alternatively, I examine whether the type of 
M&A  experience,  i.e.  a  law  firm’s  experience  representing  acquirers  or  targets,  is 
responsible for the variation, as the perceived value of defenses to lawyers may depend 
on the role the law firm typically plays in M&A transactions. I also examine whether the 
location of the law firm affects whether a law firm installs takeover defenses in IPO 
firms. 
Second,  I  examine  the  relationship  between  the  type  of  an  issuer’s  pre-IPO 
shareholders and the presence of takeover defenses at IPOs. Because the most ardent 
opponents of takeover defenses in public companies are mutual funds and institutional 
investors that invest in private equity and venture capital funds, the institutional investor 
efficiency hypothesis predicts that companies backed by private equity or venture capital 
funds are less likely to go public with takeover defenses than other firms. Contrarily, 
private equity and venture capital firms may find IPO takeover defenses optimal because 
they may allow them to maintain outsize influence on companies once they go public. It 
is also possible that private equity and venture funds may discipline management and 
                                                 
† E.g., Alison Frankel, Columbia professor defends Harvard Law from Wachtell attack, THOMSON 
REUTERS,  April  3,  2012,  http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2012/04_-
_April/Columbia_professor_defends_Harvard_Law_from_Wachtell_attack/. 
‡ See Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 153 (Del. Ch. 2011) (upholding a 
staggered board’s discretion to maintain a poison pill even after losing an election to a hostile bidder). 
§  GEORGESON,  2012  ANNUAL  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  REVIEW 6 –7  (2013), 
http://www.georgeson.com/us/resource/Pages/acgr.aspx (detailing the support for shareholder proposals to 
declassify boards).   2 
serve as substitutes for the external market for corporate control and, therefore, their 
presence  as  pre-IPO  shareholders  may  not  affect  the  adoption  of  takeover  defenses. 
Finally,  the  management  entrenchment  hypothesis  predicts  that  pre-IPO  manager-
shareholders may find that IPO takeover defenses are optimal in order to protect their 
non-pecuniary benefits of control. 
I rely on a sample of 259 initial public offerings for U.S. companies from 2008 to 
2012, public positions and proxy voting policies published by institutional investors, and 
numerous interviews with partners and principals at law firms, venture capital firms, and 
private equity firms in order to investigate the law firm hypotheses, pre-IPO shareholder 
hypotheses, and management entrenchment hypothesis. As a preliminary matter, I find 
that the percentage of companies that go public with a classified board is significantly 
higher  than  the  percentage  of  similarly  sized  public  companies  that  have  classified 
boards.  
First, I find strong empirical evidence that the identity of an issuer’s law firm and 
the firm’s role in public M&A transactions affects whether the issuer goes public with an 
effective staggered board. Issuers using law firms that predominantly represented M&A 
targets were more likely to go public with a classified board, while acquirer-side M&A 
experience was correlated with a lower likelihood of takeover defense adoption. The 
contrast between two very different law firms—Wilson Sonsini and Simpson Thacher—
is  particularly  illustrative.  Wilson  Sonsini,  a  Palo  Alto-based  law  firm  famous  for 
representing venture-backed companies and which primarily represents M&A targets, is 
installing staggered boards at 100% of its clients while Simpson Thacher, a New York 
law firm that is well-known for its private equity practice and its representation of M&A 
acquirers, only installs staggered boards at 50% of its IPO clients. These findings stand in 
stark contrast from the findings of a previous study by Professor John Coates, in which 
Wilson Sonsini was found to never install classified boards in the early 1990s while New 
York law firms were much more likely to install such defenses in IPO companies. 
Second,  the  presence  of  a  venture  capital  fund  amongst  an  issuer’s  pre-IPO 
shareholders is correlated with a significantly higher likelihood that an issuer goes public 
with an effective staggered board. On the other hand, the presence of a private equity 
fund has no statistically significant relationship with the adoption of a staggered board 
and decreases the likelihood that a company goes public with dual class control structure. 
These  results  are  particularly  interesting  because  there  is  significant  overlap  in  the 
identity of limited partners in private equity and venture capital funds, and many of these 
limited partners zealously oppose takeover defenses in public companies. Additionally, I 
find that issuers in which mutual and pension funds are significant pre-IPO shareholders 
almost always go public with the strongest takeover defenses despite the fact that these 
shareholders have publicly adopted positions that ardently oppose these defenses. Lastly,   3 
there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to  conclude  that  pre-IPO  shareholder-managers  take 
companies  public  with  takeover  defenses  in  order  to  protect  their  private  benefits  of 
control. 
The  fact  that  the  two  most  prominent  types  of  financial  sponsors  in  the  IPO 
market—private  equity  funds  and  venture  capital  funds—install  such  defenses  at 
significantly  different  rates  provides  evidence  that  it  is  not  generally  optimal  for 
companies to go public with takeover defenses. The lack of a consensus amongst the law 
firms with the most experience regarding takeover defenses adds further support for this 
conclusion.  I  conclude  this  Article  by  calling  attention  to  two  implications  of  my 
findings. First, I suggest that institutional investors and mutual funds need to investigate 
their inconsistent behavior with respect to takeover defenses. If they truly believe in their 
publicly adopted corporate governance policies and wish to serve as stewards as good 
governance, they need to make sure that their investment decisions are consistent with 
their positions. Finally, I note that the governance arrangements that may be optimal for 
companies  at  their  IPOs  may  not  be  optimal  later  in  their  public  lives.  Therefore,  I 
suggest that companies that wish to go public with defenses such as staggered boards 
should install automatic sunset provisions for these defenses in order to maximize value. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Part  II  begins  with  a 
discussion of the market for corporate control and provides a brief overview of takeover 
defenses. I then review and propose theories to explain the variation in takeover defenses 
at IPO companies. Part III describes the sample and details the variables that I examine. 
Part IV presents the results of the empirical tests used to test the competing theories and 
my interpretations of the empirical and qualitative data. Part V presents my conclusion.   
II.  TAKEOVER DEFENSES IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 
A.   The Market for Corporate Control and Takeover Defenses at Public Companies 
In  a  groundbreaking  article  in  1965,  Henry  Manne  famously  introduced  the 
“market for corporate control” and explained how it serves as a disciplining force on 
public company management by pressuring them to perform, or else risk the sale of the 
company to somebody who will do a better job.
** Manne succinctly described the forces 
at work:  
The lower the stock price, relative to what it could be with more efficient 
management,  the  more  attractive  the  take-over  becomes  to  those  who 
                                                 
** See generally H e n r y  G .  M a n n e ,  Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,  73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965).   4 
believe  that  they  can  manage  the  company  more  efficiently.  And  the 
potential  return  from  the  successful  take-over  and  revitalization  of  a 
poorly run company can be enormous. . . . Only the take-over scheme 
provides  some  assurance  of  competitive  efficiency  among  corporate 
managers  and  thereby  affords  strong  protection  to  the  interests  of  vast 
numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders.
†† 
Manne, however, also noted that the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control 
weakens  when  transaction  costs,  legal  barriers,  and  practical  barriers  increase.
‡‡ In 
today’s market, the most prominent barrier comes in the form of takeover defenses that 
insulate management from the market. 
  In an effort to fend off coercive bust-up takeovers and threats of greenmail by 
corporate raiders in the early 1980s, corporate lawyer Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, 
Rosen & Katz (“Wachtell Lipton”) introduced a potent defense that drastically changed 
the landscape of the takeover universe: the shareholder rights plan, commonly referred to 
as a “poison pill.” As a result of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision upholding the 
legality of the pill in Moran v. Household International,
§§ the only practical way for a 
bidder to obtain control of a company whose board has adopted and maintained a pill is 
to replace the company’s board with one that will redeem the pill.
*** If the entire board is 
up for election on an annual basis, then the bidder can simply run a proxy contest at the 
next annual meeting to replace the board and have the pill redeemed.
††† However, when a 
poison pill is combined with a classified board, the target board can maintain a pill even 
after losing a proxy contest to the hostile bidder. 
1.  Overview of classified boards and takeover defenses. 
  Corporate law vests the power to manage the corporation in its board of directors. 
Directors have traditionally been given substantial flexibility, subject to fiduciary duties, 
to pursue their vision of what they believe is best for the corporation and the shareholders 
                                                 
†† Id. at 113. 
‡‡ Id. at 119. 
§§ 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
*** See id. at 1354. A Delaware court could technically order the board to redeem a pill under 
Unocal if the board has not fulfilled its fiduciary duties, but courts almost never do so. E.g., Air Products & 
Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 129 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“The mechanisms in place to get around 
the poison pill—even a poison pill in combination with a staggered board, which no doubt makes the 
process prohibitively more difficult—have been in place since 1985, when the Delaware Supreme Court 
first decided to uphold the pill as a legal defense to an unwanted bid. That is the current state of Delaware 
law until the Supreme Court changes it.”). But see City Capital Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 
551 A.2d 787, 800 (Del. Ch. 1988) (granting a preliminary injunction ordering a board to redeem a poison 
pill after finding that it was not proportionate to the threat under Unocal). 
††† See L e o  E .  S t r i n e ,  J r . ,  One  Fundamental  Corporate  Governance  Question  We  Face:  Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long 
Term, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 (2010).    5 
they  represent. T he  legitimacy  of  this  directorial  power  ultimately  rests  upon  the 
preservation  of  the  shareholder  franchise.
‡‡‡ As  noted  by  Chancellor  Strine  of  the 
Delaware  Court  of  Chancery,  shareholders  have  an  especially  legitimate  interest  in 
having a regular opportunity to elect a new board when directors have the authority to 
use takeover defenses that insulate the company from the market for corporate control.
§§§   
Under the default law in almost every state, all directors stand for election at each 
annual meeting.
**** However, all states also provide an exemption from this requirement 
if the company elects to have a staggered, or classified, board.
†††† In a company with a 
staggered board, directors are grouped into separate classes. Only one class will stand for 
election at each annual meeting, and it will be elected for a term of years equal to the 
number  of  classes.
‡‡‡‡ The  most  common  (and  in  many  states  such  as  Delaware, 
maximum) number of classes is three. For example, a board of nine directors would be 
split into three equal classes, each consisting of three directors. The three directors of 
Class I may stand for election for a three-year term at the 2014 annual meeting. Class II 
would stand for (re)election at the 2015 annual meeting while the three directors of Class 
III would stand for (re)election at the 2016 annual meeting. 
Because only one third of the board is up for election at each annual meeting at a 
company  with  a  three-class  staggered  board,  a  bidder—no  matter  how  attractive  his 
offer—may have to win two successive elections in order to replace a majority of the 
board  and  redeem  a  poison  pill.  This  insulates  management  from  and  weakens  the 
benefits provided by  the market for corporate control. In fact, the most potent version of 
a  staggered  board—an  “effective  staggered b oard”  (“ESB”)—is  designed  to  prevent 
circumvention so that there is no possible way to replace a majority of the board in less 
than  two  annual  elections.  Professors  Lucian  Bebchuk,  John  Coates,  and  Guhan 
Subramanian expound upon the remarkable force of the ESB:  
There are two reasons why an ESB presents such a serious impediment to 
a hostile bidder seeking to gain control over the incumbents’ objections. 
First, an ESB substantially increases the delay involved in gaining control 
                                                 
‡‡‡ Blasius  Indus.,  Inc.  v.  Atlas  Corp.,  564  A.2d  651,  658  (Del.  Ch.  1988)  (“The  shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”). 
§§§ See Strine, supra note †††, at 6. 
**** See Lucian Bebchuk, John C. Coates & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force 
of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 893 (2002) [hereinafter BCS, 
Effective Staggered Boards]. The exceptions include Iowa and, until recently, Oklahoma. Iowa amended its 
laws  to  provide  for  mandatory  staggered  boards  until  at  least  December  2014.  IA. BUS. CORP. ACT §  
490.806A (West 2013). In late 2010, Oklahoma required publicly traded companies to adopt staggered 
boards. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1027(D). In March 2013, however, the legislature reversed course and 
changed the default law back to annual elections. Oklahoma General Corporation Act, 2013 Okla. Sess. 
Law Serv. ch. 1 (H.B. 1646) (West). 
†††† E.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.06; CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.5. 
‡‡‡‡ Id.   6 
of  the  board  and,  importantly,  establishes  a  large  minimum  delay.  No 
matter when a hostile bidder emerges, gaining control of the board would 
take at least one year, a very long time indeed in the dynamic world of 
corporate  acquisitions.  Second,  beyond  the  costs  imposed  by  delay,  to 
overcome an ESB a bidder must win two elections, far apart in time, rather 
than one up-or-down referendum conducted at a single point in time. [T]he 
two-election  problem  is  a  serious  one  that,  combined  with  the  delay 
problem,  makes  an  ESB  a  powerful,  even  if  not  insurmountable, 
antitakeover device. Indeed, . . . an ESB provides managers with stronger 
protection  from  a  hostile  takeover  than  would  an  arrangement  (not 
currently  permitted  under  Delaware  law)  providing  directors  with 
guaranteed three-year terms.
§§§§ 
  Arguments on the merits of takeover defenses such as classified boards have been 
put forward in dozens of empirical studies, law review articles, and law firm memos and 
are synthesized in other works.
***** Proponents have argued that classified boards help 
companies  fend  off  inadequate  takeover  bids,
††††† are  necessary  for  increased  board 
stability,  and  promote  longer-term  strategic  thinking.
‡‡‡‡‡ Numerous  empirical  studies 
have rejected such claims.
§§§§§ Field and Karpoff found that firms with takeover defenses 
are less likely to be acquired and that managers can use defenses to protect their private 
benefits  of  control  at  the  expense  of  outside  shareholders  such  as  institutional 
investors.
****** On the other hand, Bates et al. found that the presence of a classified board 
might  increase  the  proportion  of  total  surplus  that  target  shareholders  receive  in  an 
                                                 
§§§§ BCS, Effective Staggered Boards, supra note ****, at 890. 
***** For an overview of some of the most convincing arguments and literature, see Coates, infra 
note †††††††††††††††, at Part III. 
††††† Michael J. Merced, Wachtell Defends Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, March 21, 
2012,  http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/wachtell-defends-staggered-boards/  (quoting  a  Wachtell 
Lipton client memo). 
‡‡‡‡‡ Powerpoint: Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, Corporate Governance 21 (Dec. 2012), available 
at http://www.wlrk.com/files/2012/CorporateGovernanceDecember2012.pdf. 
§§§§§ See, e.g., Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Stability, and Strategic Risk Taking, 65 FIN. 
ANALYST J. 54, 63 (2009) (finding that there was no statistically significant difference in continuity rates 
for independent directors of companies with classified boards as opposed to non-classified boards, and that 
companies with classified boards invested less in research in development). 
******  Laura Field & Jonathan Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1857, 1873 
(2002).   7 
acquisition.
†††††† However,  this  surplus  is  likely  offset  by  the  overall  reduction  in 
announcement period returns
‡‡‡‡‡‡ and deterrence of takeover bids in the first place.
§§§§§§  
In one of the most influential studies on the topic, Lucian Bebchuk and Alma 
Cohen  examined  the  relationship  between  the  presence  of  a  classified  board  and a  
company’s Tobin’s Q, a proxy for firm value.
******* They found that board classification 
was  associated  with  a  decrease  in  firm  value.  The  results  were  both  statistically 
significant and economically meaningful.
††††††† However, when separating charter-based 
and bylaws-based staggered boards in their dataset, Bebchuk and Cohen found that only 
charter-based staggered boards had a statistically significant negative correlation with 
firm value.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Unlike amendments to the corporate charter, bylaw amendments need 
not be initiated by or approved by the board of a corporation under the Delaware Code 
and the Model Business Corporation Act.
§§§§§§§ A motivated hostile  acquirer equipped 
with knowledgeable legal counsel could amend the bylaws to eliminate the staggered 
board, rendering the classification illusory. 
Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian expanded on this analysis and introduced the 
concept of an effective staggered board, a staggered board that is “appropriately designed 
to prevent circumvention” by a hostile bidder who does not want to go through two 
elections.
******** Therefore, the presence of an ESB is a much more meaningful variable 
than mere board classification. A staggered board may be labeled as an ESB if it is 
installed  in  the  charter,
††††††††  directors  may  only  be  removed  for  cause,
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ and 
                                                 
†††††† Thomas Bates et al., Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from the 
Market for Corporate Control, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 656, 669 (2008) (finding that “board classiﬁcation by 
targets  is  associated  with  a  larger  proportional  distribution  of  total  bid  surplus  for  target  shareholders 
relative to the distributions that obtain for targets represented by a single class of directors,” but cautioning 
“against a strong interpretation of this result”). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡ Ronald Masulis et al., Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1875 
(2007). The authors found a statistically significant decrease in the bidder’s 5-day cumulative abnormal 
returns when a target had classified board. They also found a statistically significant decrease for each 
marginal addition of a takeover defense in the E-Index, as well as the Gompers 24-variable IRRC index. 
§§§§§§ Bates et al., supra note ††††††, at 671 (finding that companies with a classified board were 
0.5% less likely to receive a takeover bid). 
*******  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 
423 (2005). Q is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and  Allen  Ferrell  later  on  expanded  this  study  by  analyzing  what  other  antitakeover  provisions  had  a 
negative relationship with Tobin’s Q and came up with a 6-variable Entrenchment Index (“E-Index”). See 
generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 
REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009). 
††††††† Bebchuk & Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, supra note *******, at 410. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 429. 
§§§§§§§ See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §109; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.20; N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 601. 
********  BCS, Effective Staggered Boards, supra note ****, at 890.  
†††††††† One needs the approval of both shareholders and the board in order to remove a staggered 
board that is installed in the charter. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §242. Alternatively, if a staggered board is   8 
shareholders cannot “pack the board” by increasing the number of directors and filling 
the vacancies themselves.
§§§§§§§§ 
Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian found that firms with an ESB did not receive 
a  statistically  significant  different  bid  premium,  on  average,  than  firms  without  an 
ESB.
********* Underscoring the deterrent effect of an ESB, they found that an ESB doubled 
the likelihood that a target would remain independent following a bid and cuts the odds 
of  the  target  being  taken  over  by  the  first  bid  in  half.
††††††††† They  conclude  that 
shareholders of companies that used their ESBs to fend off acquirers were made worse 
off than if those companies accepted the hostile bids.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ A more recent event study by 
Guo,  Kruse,  and  Nohel  examined  the  stock  market  reaction  to  public  company 
announcements  of  management  plans  to  eliminate  staggered  boards.  They  found  that 
shareholders experienced statistically significant positive abnormal returns when portfolio 
companies revealed immediate plans to switch to annual elections.
§§§§§§§§§ These results 
provide persuasive evidence that staggered boards destroy may value in public companies 
by insulating management from the market for corporate control. 
2.  Opposition to takeover defenses at public companies. 
  While there may not be a unanimous academic consensus, institutional investors’ 
omnipotent opposition to takeover defenses at public companies indicates that there is a 
consensus in the investor community regarding the inefficiency of takeover. Institutional 
investors have largely opposed the adoption or bolstering of takeover defenses at public 
companies.
**********  In  fact,  many  have  adopted  and  recommended  guidelines  to 
automatically  oppose  such  amendments.
†††††††††† All  of  the  five  largest  U.S.  mutual 
                                                                                                                                                
located in the bylaws and a supermajority of the vote is required to amend the bylaw, it may be classified as 
an ESB. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Directors of companies incorporated in Delaware may only be removed for cause unless the 
charter explicitly allows for removal without cause. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §109(k). 
§§§§§§§§ BCS, Effective Staggered Boards, supra note ****, at 894. 
*********  Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance, supra note *******, 
at 936. 
††††††††† BCS, Effective Staggered Boards, supra note ****, at 930. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 934–35. 
§§§§§§§§§ Re-Jin Guo, Timothy A. Kruse & Tom Nohel, Undoing the powerful anti-takeover force of 
staggered boards, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 274, 287 (2008). 
**********  See,  e.g.,  WILMERHALE,  2010  IPO  REPORT  12 ( 2 0 1 0 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t  
http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/upload/IPO_report_2010.pdf;  Bates  et  al.,  supra  note  ††††††, a t  6 6 9  
(“[in] 2005 more than 65 firms had a repeal [of classified boards] proposed in the annual proxy, while the 
proportion of firms covered by ISS with classified boards declined from 55.10% in 2003 to 52.60% in 
2005”); Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Antitakeover Protection at the 
IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 755, 759 (2003). 
†††††††††† Robert  Daines  &  Michael  Klausner,  Do  IPO  Charters  Maximize  Firm  Value? 
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 87 (2001).    9 
funds,
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ the  Council  of  Institutional  Investors,
§§§§§§§§§§ the  largest  public  pension 
funds,
*********** and the leading proxy advisory firms (ISS and Glass Lewis)
††††††††††† have 
adopted  policies  that  support  the  annual  election  of  directors  and  oppose  board 
classification. The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan—which manages over $117 billion in 
assets—recently summarized several reasons why it opposes staggered boards: 
We see many disadvantages with a classified system. Staggered terms for 
board  member  make  it  more  problematic  for  shareholders  to  make 
fundamental  changes  to  the  composition  and  behaviour  of  boards,  by 
making it extremely difficult for any challenge to, or change in, board 
control.  In  circumstances  of  deteriorating  corporate  performance,  this 
difficulty  could  result  in  a  permanent  impairment  of  long-term 
shareholder value.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Many public companies—especially the largest ones—have chosen to declassify 
their boards in response widespread opposition. From 2000 to 2009, the number of S&P 
500 companies with staggered boards declined by more than 40%.
§§§§§§§§§§§ In the 2012 
proxy season alone, Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Project (“SRP”)
************ submitted 90 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  See  FIDELITY,  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  AND  PROXY  GUIDELINES ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  
http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/InvestExpertise/governance.shtml;  VANGUARD, 
UPDATE  ON  PROXY  VOTING—JUNE  2012 ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  h t t p s : / / i n v e s t o r . v a n g u a r d . c o m / a b o u t / u p d a t e -on-proxy-
voting-june-30-2012;  AMERICAN  FUNDS,  PROXY  VOTING  PROCEDURES  AND  PRINCIPLES 3  ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  
https://www.americanfunds.com/pdf/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf;  FRANKLIN MUTUAL ADVISERS, PROXY 
VOTING  POLICIES  &  PROCEDURES 5  ( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  
https://www.franklintempleton.com/retail/pdf/proxies/FMA_ProxyVotingPolicies.pdf;  T.  ROWE  PRICE, 
PROXY  VOTING  POLICIES ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  
http://corporate.troweprice.com/ccw/home/socialResponsibility/conductingBusinessResponsibly/proxyVoti
ngPolicies.do. In fact, all of the top twenty-five mutual fund families (by assets under management) have 
adopted policies that oppose an effective staggered board.  
§§§§§§§§§§ COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, POLICES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2012), 
http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies#BOD. 
***********  For  example,  the  California  Public  Employees’  Retirement  System  (CalPERS),  the 
largest public pension fund in the U.S., calls for annual director elections in its corporate governance 
principles for proxy votes. CALPERS, GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
17  (2010),  http://www.calpers-governance.org/docs-sof/principles/2010-5-2-global-principles-of-
accountable-corp-gov.pdf. 
†††††††††††  INSTITUTIONAL  SHAREHOLDER  SERVICES,  2013  U.S.  PROXY  VOTING  SUMMARY 
GUIDELINES ( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  h t t p : / / w w w . i s s g o v e r n a n c e . c o m / f i l e s / 2 0 1 3 I S S U S S u m m a r y G u i d e l i n e s 1 3 1 2 0 1 3 . p d f ;  
GLASS  LEWIS  &  CO.,  PROXY  PAPER  GUIDELINES ( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  
http://glasslewis.com/assets/uploads/2012/02/Guidelines_UnitedStates_2013_Abridged.pdf. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  ONTARIO  TEACHERS'  PENSION  PLAN,  GOOD  GOVERNANCE  IS  GOOD  BUSINESS: 
CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROXY  VOTING  GUIDELINES  26 ( 2 0 1 3 )  ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) ,  
http://www.otpp.com/documents/10179/20940/TeachersCorpGovE.pdf/cfca9682-9368-4cf4-96ce-
fe5381d5647e. 
§§§§§§§§§§§ Lucian  A.  Bebchuk,  Alma  Cohen  &  Charles  C.Y.  Wang,  Staggered Boards and the 
Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments 2 (Harvard Law & Econ., Discussion 
Paper No. 697, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806. 
************  Harvard’s  Shareholder  Rights P r o j e c t  i s  a  c l i n i c a l  p r o g r a m  a t  H a r v a r d  L a w  S c h o o l  
directed  by  Professor  Lucian  A.  Bebchuk.  Shareholder  Rights  Project,  HARVARD  LAW  SCHOOL, 
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shareholder proposals on behalf of six public pension funds calling for boards to switch 
to annual elections. In its first year, SRP successfully declassified the boards of one-third 
of  the  S&P  500  companies  that  had  staggered  boards.
††††††††††††  The  subsequent 
management  declassification  proposals  received  an  average  of  99  percent  of  votes 
cast,
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ revealing investors’ robust opposition to classified boards. 
B.  Theories on the Determinants in Takeover Defenses at IPO Firms 
The robust academic and nearly unanimous investor opposition to defenses in 
public companies provides convincing support to the theory that takeover defenses are 
inefficient and destroy shareholder value in public companies. Surprisingly, however, a 
vast majority—reportedly as many as 86%
§§§§§§§§§§§§—of companies still go public with 
staggered boards. In today’s market, where it has become nearly impossible to adopt 
takeover  defenses  that  require  shareholder  approval  in  public  companies,
 ************* a 
firm’s selection of takeover defenses and board structure at its IPO is a critical decision. 
Nevertheless, as companies are generally believed to attempt to maximize their value 
when they go public, one would expect issuers to go public without takeover defenses 
that are widely said to destroy value. In order to explain this puzzle, I explore how the 
issuer’s  choice  of  law  firm,  the  type  of  pre-IPO  shareholders,  and  indicia  of 
management’s private benefits of control may affect an issuer’s decision to go public 
with takeover defenses that insulate the issuer from the market for corporate control. 
1.  Law firm effects on IPO takeover defenses. 
A  little-discussed  but  tremendously  important  determinant  of  the  variation  of 
takeover defenses is the legal services provided to pre-IPO shareholder managers. In a 
1984  article,  Gilson  aptly  described  corporate  lawyers  serve  as  “transaction  cost 
engineers.”
†††††††††††††  Because  of  their  skill  at  structuring  the  form  of  transaction, 
corporate  lawyers  have  become  the  primary  players  in  many  types  of 
transactions.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In transactions that involve complex regulatory issues—notably, 
IPOs—lawyers play a critical role in designing the transaction structure in order to attain 
                                                 
†††††††††††† LUCIAN  A.  BEBCHUK,  THE  SHAREHOLDER  RIGHTS  PROJECT  2012  REPORT 2  ( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  
available at http://srp.law.harvard.edu/releases/SRP-2012-Annual-Report.pdf. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  GEORGESON,  2012  ANNUAL  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  REVIEW 6 –7  (2013), 
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††††††††††††† Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers, 94 YALE L.J. 293, 310 (1984). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id.   11 
the desired regulatory treatment.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Gilson therefore hypothesized, “economies of 
scope should cause the non-regulatory aspects of transactional structuring to gravitate to 
the lawyer as well.”
************** Later, Dent built upon Gilson’s analysis and argued that it 
is probably more fitting to describe lawyers as “enterprise architects.”
†††††††††††††† While 
the client of a corporate lawyer is supposed to be the corporation, in transactions such as 
IPOs, the lawyer often works for multiple parties with divergent interests. The lawyer 
may directly work with the managers, the board of directors, and sophisticated pre-IPO 
shareholders such as venture capital and private equity funds. However, the lawyers also 
have  to  weigh  the  effects  of  their  work  on  the  corporate  entity  itself  and  outside 
shareholders who they likely have never met. Additionally, in complex transactions that 
are not negotiated at arms length, opportunism is a significant issue.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Therefore, 
corporate lawyers need technical skills in “enterprise design”—creating the best entity 
structure for each transaction.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ One can easily see how IPO legal counseling 
brings the concept of lawyers as “enterprise architects” to life. After all, lawyers prepare 
the registration statement and author the documents—charters and bylaws—that contain 
takeover defenses.  
This lays the basis for a potential agency problem: the agency costs between pre-
IPO  shareholders  and  their  lawyers.
*************** Managers  (principals),  who  often  have 
little-to-no experience in IPOs, rely on their lawyers (agents) to provide advice about the 
corporate structure, takeover defenses, and their implementation. In the seminal paper on 
this topic, Coates suggests that most clients are ill-equipped to monitor implementation 
and have little information about the effects of their lawyers’ actions, which may not 
manifest until years down the road.
††††††††††††††† As it takes substantial effort for lawyers to 
gain proficiency in advising about and implementing takeover defenses, Coates suggested 
“lawyers will only undertake the minimal level of effort that an be easily monitored by 
clients.”
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The  pre-IPO  shareholders  ultimately  bear  the  agency  costs  in  the 
form  of  reduced  IPO  proceeds  and  a  lower  subsequent  market  value  for  their 
shares.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
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LAW. 279 (2009). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 287. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Id. at 299. 
***************  Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 713, 736 (2003). 
††††††††††††††† John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 
89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1357 (2001) [hereinafter Coates, Blame the Lawyers]. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See B. ESPEN ECKBO, 1 HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 973 (2008).   12 
Coates suggested that the quality of legal services provided to IPO companies 
varies significantly, depending on the experience, size, and location of the law firm that 
serves as IPO counsel.
**************** He found strong support for the proposition that a 
firm’s array of takeover defenses is determined by lawyers. Specifically, he observed that 
the overall merger and acquisition (“M&A”) experience, size, and location of law firms 
strongly correlate with the strength of takeover defenses present at an IPO.
††††††††††††††††  
Coates’s central hypothesis was that takeover defense adoption should correlate 
with whether the company’s legal counsel has takeover proficiency, measured by the 
number  of  M&A  transactions  for  which  the  law  firm  served  as  primary 
counsel.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Coates observed that during the early 1990s, top M&A firms, such as 
Wachtell Lipton, did not handle many IPOs and that leading IPO firms, such as Wilson 
Sonsini, did not handle a high volume of takeovers.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Firms with more M&A 
experience already have expertise in understanding and implementing takeover defenses 
and would not need to exert much additional effort in order to give their clients the 
optimal advice on takeover defenses. Coates therefore hypothesized that if defenses are 
good for pre-IPO managers, the correlation will be positive; if bad, negative. 
***************** 
Companies advised by larger law firms with more overall M&A experience were found 
to  adopt  more  defenses,  suggesting  that  takeover  defenses  were  optimal  for  pre-IPO 
managers at the time. 
Bebchuk,  however,  identifies  another  agency  issue  that  weakens  Coates’s 
conclusion about whether takeover defenses are good for pre-IPO shareholders: lawyers’ 
incentives  might  lead  them  to  prefer  the  adoption  of  strong  antitakeover  protections, 
whether or not it is in the best interest of pre-IPO shareholders, because lawyers can 
expect to feel the costs of another arrangement more than its benefits.
††††††††††††††††† The 
costs include a greater likelihood that the company will be taken over and the lawyer will 
lose it as a client, the proposition that managers may blame their lawyers if they find 
themselves without takeover defenses, and the reputational costs to the lawyers resulting 
from easier takeovers of their clients.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Meanwhile, the benefit of a slightly 
higher IPO valuation is unlikely to be visible or attributed to the lawyer.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ This 
agency problem also leads one to expect that the overall prevalence of takeover defenses 
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‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. at 1336. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Id. at 1314. 
*****************  Id. at 1336. 
†††††††††††††††††  Bebchuk, supra note ***************, at 736. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  See id. 
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should  increase  over  time  as  lawyers  learn  to  appreciate  their  skewed  incentives  to 
include more protection.
******************  
  I refer to this as the “Law Firm M&A” hypothesis, which predicts that law firms 
with  more  M&A  experience—whether  they  represent  targets  or  acquirers—are  more 
likely to advise companies to adopt strong takeover defenses at their IPOs. Confirmation 
of this hypothesis will indicate that the law firms that are most knowledgeable about 
takeover defenses believe that they are optimal. This would not mean that defenses are 
actually optimal for pre-IPO shareholders. It simply suggests that the most experienced 
law  firms  recommend  them  whether  it  is  because  they  actually  are  efficient  for  the 
shareholders, or just because the potential loss of a client or reputational harm has led the 
lawyer to believe they are optimal. 
Alternative Hypothesis 1a.  The  presence  of  issuer  takeover  defenses  is  positively 
correlated with the issuer's law firm’s M&A experience. 
I expect that there is a more nuanced relationship between a law firm’s takeover 
experience and the presence of takeover defenses at IPO companies they advise. Whereas 
Coates examined overall takeover experience, I focus on the specific role that a law firm 
actually played in the takeovers where it served as counsel. Recall that Coates observed 
that the legal market is segmented as some law firms may be more active in the IPO 
market  than  in  the  M&A  market.
††††††††††††††††††  I  suggest  that  there  is  additional 
segmentation within the M&A market—between target and acquirer representation—that 
can help explain the adoption of defenses. While it is probably somewhat rare for a law 
firm active in the M&A market to exclusively represent one or the other, many law firms 
are  known  for  predominantly  representing  either  acquirers  or  targets.  As  takeover 
defenses are often a useful tool for target-side lawyers in public M&A transactions, I 
expect that law firms that represent more targets are more likely to advise issuers to adopt 
takeover  defenses.  Across  the  table,  acquirer-side  lawyers  may  believe  that  takeover 
defenses complicate their jobs and serve as impediments to transactions. 
  Under the “Law Firm Role” hypothesis, law firms that represent more targets in 
M&A transactions are more likely to advise companies to adopt strong takeover defenses 
at their IPOs. Law firms that represent more acquirers in M&A transactions are less 
likely  to  adopt  defenses.  Confirmation  of  the  Law  Firm  Role  hypothesis  will,  at  a 
minimum, mean that one cannot point to the high incidence of takeover defenses in IPO 
companies and conclude that defenses are efficient. Instead, confirmation will suggest 
that there is not an actual client-based reason to use classified boards in IPOs and that 
their use is explained by the biases of lawyers. 
                                                 
******************  See id. 
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Alternative Hypothesis 1b.  Takeover defenses are positively correlated with an issuer’s 
law  firm’s  target-side  M&A  experience  and  negatively  correlated  with  a  law  firm’s 
acquirer-side M&A experience. 
  After hypothesizing that law firms that are physically close to one another are 
more  likely  to  share  information  or  borrow  boilerplate  from  each  other,
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Coates observed that, in the early 1990s, a company was significantly less likely to have 
defenses in place at an IPO if it was advised by a Silicon Valley law firm.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
However, this effect dissipated by 1998, as attention was drawn to this issue and as M&A 
knowledge diffused to non-M&A law firms. It is plausible that Silicon Valley law firms 
have overcorrected their past failures to understand takeover defenses and now use them 
in every IPO. Although knowledge about the adoption of defenses may have diffused to 
non-M&A  law  firms  over  the  past  two  decades,  knowledge  about  the  more  recent 
backlash, institutional investor opposition, and empirical studies may not have spread as 
quickly. The “Silicon Valley Effect” hypothesis therefore predicts that issuers advised by 
lawyers located in Silicon Valley are more likely to go public with takeover defenses than 
issuers using law firms located elsewhere. 
Hypothesis 2.   Issuers’ use of takeover defenses will be positively correlated with 
issuers’ use of Silicon Valley law firms. 
2.  Institutional investors, financial sponsors, and IPO takeover defenses. 
As private equity and venture capital funds are repeat players in the IPO market 
and seek to maximize their investment returns, one would expect that almost all IPO 
firms backed by institutional investors would have annual elections. In a 2003 paper, 
Michael Klausner summarized why one specifically would expect private equity firms to 
oppose a portfolio company’s inclusion of takeover defenses in charters at the IPO: 
The logic, underlying the expectation of takeover-friendly charters at the 
IPO  stage,  is  strongest  for  companies  with  private  equity  funds  as 
shareholders. Managers of these funds are sophisticated businesspeople 
who, one would expect, seek to maximize the value of their investments in 
portfolio companies. They are experienced in corporate governance, they 
are well positioned to understand the effect of takeover defenses on the 
value of a firm, and they generally hire sophisticated lawyers to shepherd 
portfolio  companies  through  the  IPO  process.  Moreover,  they  play  an 
active,  if  not  dominating,  role  in  managing  the  companies  in  their 
portfolios.  It  would  appear  unlikely,  therefore,  that  takeover  defenses 
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would  find  their  way  into  the  charters  of  firms  in  a  fund’s 
portfolio.
*******************  
Indeed,  in  an  earlier  study,  Daines  and  Klausner  even  chose  to  oversample  firms 
sponsored by institutional investors such as private equity and venture capital firms based 
on their belief that these firms’ incentives to maximize share value would be reflected in 
whether or not they include takeover defenses in company charters.
†††††††††††††††††††  As both 
private equity and venture capital funds are of limited duration and often seek to sell their 
shares rather shortly after an initial public offering, one would expect them to be more 
concerned  with  practices  that  maximize  share  value  instead  of  private,  possibly  non-
pecuniary, benefits of control.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Additionally, the fact that the top investors in 
private  equity  funds  are  often  public  pension  funds  such  as  CalPERS
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ is 
another reason why one would expect IPOs for companies sponsored by private equity 
funds to go public without classified boards. Past studies, however, have remarkably 
found no significant difference in the prevalence of takeover defenses such as classified 
boards  based  on  private  equity  or  venture  capital  involvement.
********************  
Nevertheless, I reexamine this “Institutional Investor Efficiency” hypothesis. 
Alternative Hypothesis 3a.  The presence of private equity, venture capital, or mutual 
fund backing has a negative correlation with a company’s pre-IPO adoption of takeover 
defenses. 
As  institutional  investors  universally  oppose  takeover  defenses  in  public 
companies and as institutional investors constitute the majority of the limited partners in 
private equity and venture capital funds, one can hypothesize that companies backed by 
institutional investors such as mutual funds, private equity funds, and venture capital 
funds are less likely to go public with potent takeover defenses than other issuers 
    a.  Overview of private equity and venture capital funds. 
  In order to comprehend how private equity and venture capital backing can affect 
portfolio company governance, one must first understand what private equity and venture 
capital firms do. Although the line between the two has become increasingly blurred and 
                                                 
*******************  Klausner, supra note **********, at 769. 
†††††††††††††††††††  See Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 93. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Id. at 94. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See  DAVID  SNOW,  PRIVATE  EQUITY:  A  BRIEF  OVERVIEW 7  ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  
http://www.peimedia.com/resources/PEI50/PEI%20Media's%20Private%20Equity%20-
%20A%20Brief%20Overview.pdf. 
********************  E.g., Klausner, supra note **********, at 769; Daines & Klausner, supra note 
††††††††††, at 103 (“[i]n all of these regressions, the coefﬁcients on the dummy variables for VC- and 
LBO-backed ﬁrms are insigniﬁcant”); Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1871–72. Additionally, Field 
and Karpoff found that management compensation is higher in firms with takeover defenses, suggesting 
that there is not a countervailing tradeoff in compensation. Id. at 1870.   16 
both have been described as falling under the umbrella of private equity,
††††††††††††††††††††  
venture capital and private equity have traditionally been considered distinct industries 
and tend to invest in portfolio companies that are “fundamentally different” from one 
another.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Private equity firms, often referred to as leveraged buyout firms, 
customarily acquire majority control stakes of existing or mature firms with predictable 
cash flows.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ On the other hand, venture capital firms “typically invest in 
young  or  emerging  companies  and  typically  do  not  obtain  majority 
control.”
*********************  Unlike the established companies often found in private equity 
portfolios, venture-backed companies usually require intensive active involvement from 
their investors. 
  Private equity firms (such as Blackstone, The Carlyle Group, and KKR) raise 
equity  capital  through  private  equity  funds  that  they  set  up.  Each  fund  is  usually 
structured  as  a  limited  partnership  and  has  a  fixed  life  of  ten  to  fifteen 
years.
†††††††††††††††††††††  Private equity firms “typically [have] up to five years to invest the 
capital committed to the fund into companies, and then [have] an additional five to eight 
years to return the capital to its investors.”
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Funds can usually be extended 
for  up  to  three  additional  years  in  order  to  preserve  private  equity  firms’ 
flexibility.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ When they invest in public companies, private equity firms will 
often  take  the  company  private  in  what  is  known  as  a  buyout,  or  leveraged  buyout 
(“LBO”) if accomplished through the use of debt. More recently, private equity firms 
have also engaged in “growth equity” investments, where they invest in “rapidly growing 
companies with proven business models.”
**********************  The private equity firm then 
typically  takes  on  an  active  role  in  the  management  and  financing  of  the  acquired 
company.  A  private  equity  firm  will  often  introduce  performance-based  managerial 
compensation, highly leveraged capital structures, and active governance to companies in 
which it invested.
††††††††††††††††††††††   
                                                 
††††††††††††††††††††  See, e.g., St even N.  Kapl an & Ant oi net t e Schoar, Private Equity Performance: 
Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 1791, 1791 (“The private equity industry, primarily 
venture capital (VC) and buyout (LBO) investments, has grown tremendously over the last decade.”). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Jarrad Harford & Adam Kolasinski, Do Private Equity Sponsors Sacrifice Long-
Term Value for Short-Term Profit? Evidence from a Comprehensive Sample of Large Buyouts and Exit 
Outcomes 5  ( U n i v .  o f  W a s h i n g t o n  F o s t e r  S c h .  o f  B u s .  W o r k i n g  P a p e r ,  2 0 1 2 )  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785927. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See, e.g.,  Steven  N.  Kaplan  &  Per  Strömberg,  Leveraged Buyouts and Private 
Equity, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 122 (2008). 
*********************  Id. 
†††††††††††††††††††††  Id. at 125. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Id.  
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Id.  
**********************  About  Our  Growth  Equity  Approach,  SUMMIT  PARTNERS, 
http://www.summitpartners.com/what-is-growth-equity.aspx (last accessed Mar. 29, 2013). 
††††††††††††††††††††††  Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, at 122.   17 
  As private equity funds are of a limited duration, a crucial element of the private 
equity business is the liquidation of a fund’s investments in portfolio companies—also 
known  as  the  exit.  A  private  equity  fund  usually  exits  an  investment  by  selling  the 
portfolio company to a strategic buyer, selling the company to another private equity 
fund, or by taking the company public in an initial public offering.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Even 
though an initial public offering is one of the least-common exit methods (used in around 
14% of exits),
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ private equity firms participated in more than one-third of 
all initial public offerings in the U.S. in recent years.
***********************  Once the portfolio 
company is listed on a public trading market, the private equity funds can gradually sell 
down their holdings.
†††††††††††††††††††††††  Following an offering, however, a fund can choose 
to  retain a  substantial  equity  stake  in  the  portfolio  company.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ It 
sometimes  may  take  years  for  a  fund  to  fully  sell  down  its  position  in  a 
company.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
  Venture capital firms traditionally take equity positions in young companies and 
high-tech  startups—many  of  which  do  not  yet  have  revenues  or  proven  business 
models—and often focus on finding companies with innovative technologies or business 
methods.
************************  Venture  capital  firms  also  structure  their  funds  as  limited 
partnerships  with  a  finite  life  of  around  ten  years.
††††††††††††††††††††††††  Venture  funds, 
however, are typically much smaller than private equity funds.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ This is 
largely explained by the fact that the venture capital business is not as scalable as the 
private equity business.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The expertise that venture capital firms offer to 
developing companies is not relevant to the more mature firms that are typically owned 
by private equity. Whereas private equity firms tend to acquire majority stakes, venture 
capital funds usually acquire minority positions and often syndicate their investments 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Id. at 132.  
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See id. 
***********************  Sharon Katz, Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private 
Equity Sponsors, 64 ACCT. REV. 623, 624 (2009). 
†††††††††††††††††††††††  A recent study of reverse leveraged buyouts—signifying a public offering for a 
company that was previously taken private in a leveraged buyout—found that buyout group ownership 
typically decreased from 59% to 40% after a public offering, largely due to the dilution from the issuance 
of new shares. Jerry Cao & Josh Lerner, The Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 
139, 143 (2009). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Id. at 140. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See SNOW, supra note §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, at 11. 
************************  Id. at 10. 
††††††††††††††††††††††††  Peggy Lee & Sunil Wahil, Grandstanding, certification and the underpricing of 
venture capital backed IPOs, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 375, 378–79 (2004). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  In 2012, even though there were 140 more venture capital fundraisings than 
private equity fundraisings, the aggregate target fund size for private equity funds was over three times the 
target  for  venture  funds.  PREQIN,  GLOBAL  PRIVATE  EQUITY  REPORT  7 ( 2 0 1 2 ) , 
http://www.preqin.com/docs/samples/preqin_global_private_equity_report_2012_sample_pages.pdf. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 
REV. FIN. STUD. 2303, 2337 (2010).   18 
alongside  one  another  in  order  to  spread  risk  and  share  expertise  and 
opportunities.
*************************  In exchange for their investment, venture capital funds 
often  extract  strong  and  disproportionate  control  rights  from  portfolio 
companies.
†††††††††††††††††††††††††  These rights typically include representation on the board, 
rights  to  approve  outside  board  members,  and  approval  rights  for  major  company 
decisions.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  
  Venture capital funds also invest with an eye towards liquidation so that they can 
return money to their investors (limited partners). Although only occurring in around ten 
percent of venture capital portfolio companies,
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ initial public offerings 
are  the  most  profitable  venture  capital  exit  and  account  for  the  majority  of  their 
investment  returns.
**************************  IPOs  are  thus  widely  viewed  as  the  primary 
vehicle for venture capital wealth creation.
††††††††††††††††††††††††††  While they typically give 
up their disproportionate voting rights, venture funds usually retain a significant portion 
of  their  equity  holdings  after  an  IPO  while  they  are  subject  to  “lock-up” 
agreements.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Venture funds then usually distribute the shares to their 
limited  partners  at  the  expiration  of  the  lock-up,  which  typically  lasts  180 
days.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§   
While the private equity industry was once dominated by buyouts of rather large 
companies  in  mature  industries,  today  a  significant  amount  of  private  equity  activity 
consists  of  middle-market  buyouts  of  privately  held  companies  and  acquisitions  of 
                                                 
*************************  See SNOW, supra note §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, at 10. 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††  See Ronald Masulis & Rajarishi Nahata, Venture Capital Conflicts of Interest: 
Evidence from Acquisitions of Venture-Backed Firms, 46 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 395, 401 (2011). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Id.  at  397.  The  most  common  successful  exit  is  an  acquisition  of  portfolio 
companies by another party, occurring about twenty percent of the time. However, the returns for such exits 
are substantially lower than returns in IPO exits. See id. 
**************************  Lee & Wahil, supra note ††††††††††††††††††††††††, at 379. 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††  Susan Chaplinsky & Swasti Gupta-Mukherjee, The Decline in Venture-backed 
IPOs: Implications for Capital Recovery 4, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON IPOS (Mario Levis & Silvio 
Vismara  eds.,  forthcoming  2013),  available  at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2199097. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  See William Megginson & Kathleen Weiss, Venture Capitalist Certification in 
Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879, 899–90 (1991). Megginson and Weiss also found the fraction of 
issuers with venture capitalists owning a majority stake fell from 28% to 8.4% after the IPO. Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, Venture Capital Distributions: Short-Run and 
Long-Run Reactions, 53 J. FIN. 2161, 2162 (1998). These distributions do not need to be registered with the 
SEC.  Studies  have f o u n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  n e g a t i v e  a b n o r m a l  r e t u r n s  a r o u n d  t h e  e x p i r a t i o n  o f  l o c k -ups  in 
companies with venture capital backing, confirming that they typically sell off or distribute their shares. 
E.g., Daniel J. Bradley et al., Venture Capital and IPO Lockup Expiration: An Empirical Analysis, 24 J. 
FIN. RES. 465, 466 (2001). See also Telis Demos, It's Hard Work Taking Tech Companies Public, WALL. 
ST. J.,  Mar.  29,  2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/03/29/its-hard-work-taking-tech-companies-public 
(describing how sell-offs on shares accompany lock-up expirations).    19 
divisions  spun  off  of  large  corporations.
***************************  Further  blurring  the  line 
between private equity and venture capital, in recent years, many private equity firms 
have been investing in growth start-ups and other venture-backed companies. 
Private  equity  funds  usually  have  more  limited  partners  than  venture  funds 
because their funds are substantially larger. The limited partners who invest in private 
equity  and  venture  funds  are  overwhelmingly  institutional  investors  and  wealthy 
individuals.
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††  Many  of  these  institutional  investors  are  private 
foundations, endowments, and public pensions funds such as CalPERS (California Public 
Employees'  Retirement  System).
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ For  example,  in  2012,  CalPERS 
allocated $34.5 billion—14.6% of its $236.5 billion assets under management—to private 
equity and venture capital funds, with a typical investment size ranging from $10 to $200 
million.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
FIGURE 1 
Limited Partners by Investor Type
****************************  
 
    b.   Do reputational concerns explain the behavior of PE & VC firms? 
Past studies have generally not found any significant difference in the incidence 
of takeover defenses such as classified boards in IPO issuers based on private equity or 
                                                 
***************************  Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, at 129–30. 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††  See SNOW, supra note §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, at 7; Lee & Wahil, supra note 
††††††††††††††††††††††††, at 379. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  PREQIN, SPECIAL REPORT: US PRIVATE EQUITY 18 (April 2012). 
****************************  Id. 
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venture  capital  involvement.
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††  However,  in  2009,  the  Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (“IRRC”) Institute sponsored a study on the impact of 
private equity sponsorship on IPO corporate governance and observed that between 2004 
and  2006,  private  equity  backed  companies  had  a  higher  proportion  of  governance 
mechanisms such as antitakeover provisions which benefited executives at the expense of 
shareholders.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  They found that companies backed by private equity 
firms were slightly more likely than those without such backing to have a classified board 
at the time of an IPO, but failed to control for any other variables.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  
The authors hypothesized  “IPO companies are getting more uniform legal advice about 
the  desirability  of  installing  a  classified  board  than  was  the  case  during  the 
1990s.”
*****************************  However, when they looked at the prevalence of “effective” 
classified boards, they found that companies backed by private equity funds were less 
likely  to  have  effective  classification  in  place  than  those  not  backed  by  such 
funds.
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††  
  This intriguing phenomenon needs an explanation. Klausner hypothesized that, in 
the past, this puzzle could have been explained by a lack of institutional knowledge—or 
just  downright  ignorance—that  sponsored  companies  were  going  public  with 
antitakeover provisions in their charters.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  As academic studies and 
institutional investor organizations called attention to this in the early 2000s, Klausner 
suggests “institutions have recently begun to make modest efforts to urge private equity 
funds to have their portfolio companies adopt takeover-friendly charters when they go 
public.”
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  However, because of the collapse of the IPO market at the 
time his article was published, Klausner was not able to perform an empirical study to see 
whether these efforts were successful.
*  
                                                 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††  E.g., Klausner, supra note **********, at 769; Daines & Klausner, supra 
note ††††††††††, at 103 (“[i]n all of these regressions, the coefﬁcients on the dummy variables for VC- 
and  LBO-backed  ﬁrms  are  insigniﬁcant”);  Field  &  Karpoff,  supra n o t e  ******,  at  1871–72.  But see 
Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1381 (finding a positive correlation between 
VC-backing and takeover defenses). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ ANNALISA  BARRETT  ET  AL.,  THE  CORPORATE  LIBRARY,  WHAT  IS  THE 
IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY BUYOUT FUND OWNERSHIP ON IPO COMPANIES’ CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? 3 
(2009),  available  at 
http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/What%20is%20Impact%20of%20PE%20on%20CG%20June%202009.pdf. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Id. at 37 (“57.4% of buyout- fund-backed companies had a classified board, 
compared with 53.7% of the other IPO companies”). 
*****************************  Id. 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††  Id. at 41 (“26.1% of buyout-fund-backed companies and 36.6% of non-PE-
backed  companies  had  effective  classified  boards”). T h e  I R R C  s t u d y  d e f i n e d  a n  “ e f f e c t i v e  c l a s s i f i e d  
board” in a different way than we define an ESB. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Klausner, supra note **********, at 764. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Id. at 756. 
* Id.   21 
Nevertheless, Klausner put forward a systematic explanation of why these efforts 
of institutional shareholders seem unlikely to succeed: 
Venture capital funds need to attract entrepreneurs in search of funding. In 
some  cases,  leveraged  buyout  firms  work  the  same  way,  attracting 
managers seeking to go private or to sell a division. For each type of fund, 
access  to  investment  opportunities  may  turn,  at  least  in  part,  on 
maintaining a positive reputation for working well with the managers of 
their portfolio companies, especially successful managers. Consequently, 
an  important  concern  for  a  fund  considering  an  institutional  investor’s 
demand for takeover-friendly charters is whether the fund’s reputation for 
working  well  with  management  is  at  risk  if  the  fund  imposes  such  a 
charter on portfolio companies that go public. To be sure, private equity 
fund managers are known to be tough with portfolio company managers. 
They  fire  many  before  a  company  goes  public.  Portfolio  company 
managers in place at the time of an IPO, however, tend to be successful 
managers. . . . The question, therefore, is whether a fund’s insistence on 
takeover-friendly  charters  may  feed a  reputation  that  the  fund i s  
uncooperative with even its most successful managers. This is ultimately 
an empirical question, but there is reason to expect the answer will be 
“yes.”
†  
In short, Klausner concluded, “the need to attract companies in which to invest 
seems  likely  to  dominate  the  views  of  other  private  equity  funds  toward  takeover 
defenses.”
‡ Indeed,  one  law  firm  (Davis  Polk  &  Wardwell)  released  a  memo  that 
specifically mentions that a fund must balance its near-term desires with the governance 
preferences  of  management  when  the  fund  sells  its  stake.
§ Another  law  firm  noted, 
“Certain  anti-takeover  provisions  may  benefit  the  [financial]  sponsor  by  making  the 
company  more  attractive  to  sophisticated  management .   .  .  Although  institutional 
investors  generally  disfavor  anti-takeover  defenses,  it  is  possible  to  include  some 
protection for companies going public without alienating institutional investors.”
** 
  Bebchuk,  however,  explains  why  Klausner’s  reputation  hypothesis  is  an 
insufficient  explanation  for  the  adoption  of  takeover  defenses  by  private  equity  and 
venture-backed firms. Bebchuk reasons that private equity and venture capital firms only 
                                                 
† Id. at 770–71. 
‡ Id. at 775. 
§ Davis Polk & Wardwell, Post-IPO Charter Provisions for Portfolio Companies (Private Equity 
Newsletter,  Feb.  2006), 
http://www.davispolk.com/1485409/dpw/02_16_06_PrivateEquityNews_feb_06.pdf. 
** Steven  Ostner  &  Xavier  P.  Grapotte,  Selected Issues to Consider When Taking a Portfolio 
Company  Public  (Debevoise  &  Plimpton  Private  Equity  Report,  Vol.  5.  No.  4,  Summer  2005), 
http://www.debevoise.com/files/Publication/23a49307-e9dc-49c8-
94252294f098dd87/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4cc690c0-55a7-4e42-
95343488039ce58d/PEReportSummer2005A.pdf.   22 
have  an  incentive  to  make  implicit  future  commitments  (to  managers)  that  can  be 
expected to increase the expected joint surplus of the parties.
†† Absent a joint surplus, the 
firms would not be expected to deviate from a value-maximizing strategy.
‡‡ In fact, a 
plausible  reputation  hypothesis  would  predict  that  PE-backed  companies  go  public 
without  takeover  defenses  in  order  to  maximize  shareholder  value.  As  private  equity 
firms are repeat players in the IPO market, they have the incentive to ensure the success 
of their IPOs in order to protect their reputation.
§§ Accordingly, Klausner’s hypothesis 
does not appear to be a sufficient explanation for this behavior.
*** 
c.   Agency  problems  between  PE &   VC  firms  and  other  pre-IPO 
shareholders. 
Private equity and venture capital funds may use certain takeover defenses to 
maintain outsize influence on the company after they sell shares when taking it public. A 
staggered board could allow such a fund to maintain its representation on a company’s 
board of directors for an extended period after taking it public. This may allow the fund 
to continue to exert substantial control of the company while it sells down whatever 
ownership positions it still possesses after the public offering. In fact, law firm literature 
targeted to the private equity industry suggests this as an advantage of maintaining a 
classified  board.
††† Additionally,  private  equity  and  venture  capital  firms  may  have 
reputational interests in the performance of portfolio companies after taking them public 
and selling their stakes. For example, if a company is sold at a price below its IPO price 
10 months after being taken public by a venture capital firm, it might signal that the 
venture capital firm took advantage of outside investors in the IPO.  
Like the law firm hypotheses, this hypothesis finds its roots in agency problems. 
While the adoption of a classified board may make shareholders worse off as a group, 
venture capital and private equity firms may find it in their own interest to include such 
provisions because they can capture private benefits while other shareholders bear the 
costs.  Management  and  other  pre-IPO  investors  are  likely  to  be  deferential  to  the 
guidance of private equity and venture capital firms that almost certainly have more IPO 
expertise than them. The risk that large investors may treat themselves preferentially at 
                                                 
†† Bebchuk, supra note ***************, at 747. 
‡‡ See id. 
§§ Cao & Lerner, supra note †††††††††††††††††††††††, at 140. 
*** Additional reasons to dismiss this hypothesis are discussed infra Part IV.C.2. 
††† Davis Polk & Wardell, Post-IPO Charter Provisions for Portfolio Companies (Private Equity 
Newsletter,  Feb.  2006), 
http://www.davispolk.com/1485409/dpw/02_16_06_PrivateEquityNews_feb_06.pdf.   23 
the  expense  of  outsiders  is  greater  when  their  control  rights  exceed  their  cash  flow 
rights.
‡‡‡  
Venture capital firms often have to give up some of their control rights at the IPO. 
Such rights typically include guarantees of board seats and veto power over significant 
firm decisions. As they give up these rights in an IPO, venture capital firms may instead 
seek to maintain disproportionate control in other ways. An obvious means of doing this 
is by installing a staggered board. A venture capital or private equity fund can extend its 
influence on the company as it can have its directors serve out their full three-year terms 
even though the fund no longer owns any shares of the company. Under the “PE/VC 
Private  Benefits”  hypothesis,  private  equity  and  venture  capital  funds  use  takeover 
defenses such as an effective staggered board in order to maintain and extract private 
benefits of control at the expense of other shareholders. 
Alternative Hypothesis 3b.  The presence of private equity or venture capital backing 
has a positive relationship with a company’s pre-IPO adoption of takeover defenses. 
d.  PE & VC firms as substitutes for external market for control. 
I  test  the  validity  of  the  Institutional  Investor  Efficiency  and  PE/VC  Private 
Benefits hypotheses against the null hypothesis that private equity and venture capital 
backing  does  not  affect  the  presence  of  takeover  defenses  at  an  IPO.  The  primary 
argument for this null hypothesis was put forward by Malcolm Baker and Paul Gompers. 
They hypothesize that financial sponsors such as venture capitalists may institute better 
internal  governance  mechanisms  that  serve  as  substitutes  for  the  external  market  for 
corporate control for portfolio companies.
§§§ With such mechanisms in place, takeover 
defenses may have little to no effect on firm performance in these portfolio companies. 
Therefore, the presence of venture capital or private equity backing may be unrelated to 
the  presence  of  a  classified  board.  This  null  hypothesis  is  also  referred  to  as  the 
“Substitute Governance” hypothesis. 
Alternative (Null) Hypothesis 3c.  There  is  no  relationship  between  the  presence  of 
private equity or venture capital backing and a company’s pre-IPO adoption of takeover 
defenses. 
  Financial sponsors certainly can serve as a substitute governance mechanism in 
their privately held portfolio companies. On its face, however, this hypothesis is rather 
unpersuasive for public companies. As previously mentioned, private equity and venture 
                                                 
‡‡‡ Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 758 
(1997). 
§§§ Malcolm Baker & Paul A. Gompers, The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public 
Offering, 46 J. FIN. 569, 579 (2003).   24 
capital  funds  are  limited  in  duration  and  need  to  eventually  exit  their  investments. 
Although they may not immediately sell their entire stakes at an IPO, they rarely are 
long-term holders of public company stock. And once a portfolio company is public and 
traded on a liquid market, the financial sponsor loses its incentive to exercise its voice.
**** 
Thus, shareholders are unlikely to value this “substitute” governance mechanism. One 
can argue that new corporate blockholder(s) may replace the financial sponsors and fulfill 
their substitute governance role. However, a study by Field and Sheehan found that only 
41% of firms with a corporate blockholder in place at the IPO had a new corporate 
blockholder one year later.
†††† And the new blockholder had a board seat in only 4% of 
their sample.
‡‡‡‡ 
3.  Managerial entrenchment and private benefits. 
  Managerial agency costs may also help explain why takeover defenses may be 
adopted at an IPO even though they are inefficient. Management may be willing to bear 
the  cost  of  a  lower  offering  price  caused  by  takeover  defenses  because  the  private 
benefits of control (utility) that they derive from the defenses may outweigh the costs of 
having  a  lower  public  valuation  of  the  company.
§§§§ This  has  come  to  be  known  as 
“managerial entrenchment,” defined by Berger, Ofek, and Yermack as “the extent to 
which managers fail to experience discipline from the full range of corporate governance 
and control mechanisms.”
***** In a study of IPO underpricing, Brennan and Franks argued 
that  a  firm’s  incumbent  management  might  structure  an  IPO  in  order  to  insulate 
themselves from the discipline imposed by the market for corporate control and maintain 
their  private  benefits  of  control  once  the  company  is  publicly  traded.
††††† There  are 
multiple reasons why management may value control at an idiosyncratically high level. 
One can easily imagine the non-pecuniary aspects of entrepreneurial activities such as the 
                                                 
**** See M a r c o  B e c h t ,  P a t r i c k  B o l t o n  &  A l i s a  R ö e l l ,  Corporate  Governance  and  Control 1 8  
(European  Corp.  Gov.  Inst.  Working  Paper  No.  02/2002  2005),  available  at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan033582.pdf;  ALBERT  O.  HIRSCHMAN, 
EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 51 (1970). 
†††† Laura C. Field & Dennis P. Sheehan, IPO underpricing and outside blockholdings, 10 J. CORP. 
FIN. 263, 275 (2004). 
‡‡‡‡ Id. at 274. 
§§§§ Bebchuk, supra note ***************, at 733. In a 1976 paper, Jensen and Meckling implied 
that  managers  may  forgo  the  adoption  of  a  value-maximizing  capital  structure  in  order  to  entrench 
themselves against pressures from corporate governance mechanisms. See generally Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312–13 (1976). 
***** Philip  G.  Berger,  Eli  Ofek,  &  David  L.  Yermack,  Managerial Entrenchment and Capital 
Structure Decisions, 92 J. FIN. 1411, 1411 (1977). 
††††† Michael J. Brennan & Julian Franks, Underpricing, ownership and control in initial public 
offerings of equity securities in the UK, 45 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 394–95 (1997).   25 
prestige associated with management position, the physical appointments of the office, 
the social status it comes with, and personal relations with employees.
‡‡‡‡‡  
  Field and Karpoff followed this line of inquiry and examined whether managers 
use takeover defenses as a mechanism to maintain their private benefits of control after 
taking a company public.
§§§§§ Under this theory, non-managerial shareholders bear much 
of the costs of takeover defenses while managers disproportionately benefit from the non-
pecuniary  benefits  of  the  defenses.  As  insider  ownership  decreases,  non-managerial 
shareholders bear a larger portion of the costs of management decisions. Therefore, Field 
and  Karpoff  hypothesized  that  defenses  would  be  more  prevalent  at  firms  where 
management owns fewer shares. Using a dataset of IPOs from 1988 to 1991, they found 
that  managers  deploy  takeover  defenses  when  they  own  few  shares,  are  highly 
compensated, and are subject to weak monitoring by non-managerial shareholders.
****** 
These results were consistent with their hypothesis that IPO managers deploy takeover 
defenses when their personal benefits are high and they only bear a small portion of the 
costs. However, a concurrent study by Daines and Klausner reached the opposite result, 
finding  that  defense  adoption  increases  as  insider’s  pre-IPO  share  ownership 
increases.
†††††† 
While, on average, takeover defenses may entrench management to the detriment 
of shareholders, it is also possible that the use of such provisions may be efficient in 
some situations. The most common theory is that takeover defenses provide incumbent 
management with bargaining power, allowing them to expropriate to their shareholders a 
larger portion of the value of an eventual merger transaction. However, Field and Karpoff 
found that takeover defenses at the time of the IPO are associated with longer-term firm 
independence  (a  lower  probability  of  being  acquired  within  five  years)  and  that  IPO 
takeover  defenses  did  not  have  a  statistically  significant  relationship  with  takeover 
premiums.
‡‡‡‡‡‡ In a concurrent study, Daines and Klausner also found that the bargaining 
power hypothesis does not explain the adoption of takeover defenses.
§§§§§§ In fact, they 
found the opposite: takeover defenses are more protective where the hypothesis predicted 
they are the least efficient. 
  As  previous  studies  have  reached  conflicting  results,  I  examine  whether  the 
“Management Entrenchment” hypothesis can explain the adoption of takeover defenses at 
an IPO. I focus on four variables as proxies for measuring managers’ personal benefits of 
control. 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡ Jensen & Meckling, supra note §§§, at 312. 
§§§§§ Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1858. 
******  Id. 
†††††† Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 110. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡ Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1877. 
§§§§§§ Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 102.   26 
Hypothesis 4. Companies  are  more  likely  to  have  strong  takeover  defenses  when  the 
private  benefits  of  control  are  high.  Therefore,  takeover  defenses  should  be  positive 
correlated with CEO-Chair and CEO-Founder, and negatively correlated with CEO-Age 
and Insider. 
  First,  I  examine  whether  the  Chief  Executive  Officer  (“CEO”)  of  the  IPO 
company is also a founder of the company. Recall that Coates argued “entrepreneurs may 
place special value on companies they create, and long association can create attachments 
making  control,  with  assurance  of  continued  association,  uniquely  valuable  to  an 
individual.”
******* Additionally, whenever founders bring in more outside investors, the 
chances  that  they  will  be  replaced  increases  dramatically.
††††††† Therefore,  a  founding 
CEO will want to preserve excess control in order to better secure his position and its 
associated benefits in the future. The managerial private benefits hypothesis suggests that 
the inclusion of an effective staggered board should be positively related to the presence 
of a founding CEO. While Daines and Klausner found that the presence of a founding 
CEO  had  no  significant  effect  on  a  firms’  adoption  of  anti-takeover  provisions,
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Coates found that it was positively associated with the presence of more defenses.
§§§§§§§ 
I include data on whether the firm’s CEO also serves as the chairman of the firm’s 
board. One reason that public companies have a board of directors is to minimize the 
agency costs resulting from the separation of management and control. Thus, a central 
purpose  of  the  board  is  to  hold  management  accountable  on  behalf  of  dispersed 
shareholders. As posited by Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, a board that is dominated 
by  the  CEO  is  not  an  effective  monitor  of  management.
******** Such  a  board  cannot 
effectively perform its internal control function and is more likely to acquiesce to the 
CEO  than  an  independently  lead  board.  A  CEO  who  serves  as  board  chairman  may 
therefore have substantial control over the choice of the firm’s governance structure. In 
fact, Field and Karpoff found that takeover defenses were more likely to be used when a 
company’s  CEO  served  as  its  board  chairman,  and  concluded  that  firms  with  weak 
controls over senior management were more likely to use takeover defenses.
††††††††  
                                                 
*******  Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1331. 
††††††† Michael  J.  Roberts,  The  Founding  CEO’s  Dilemma:  Stay  or  Go?,  HBS  WORKING 
KNOWLEDGE, Aug. 15, 2005, http://hbswk.hbs.Fedu/item/4948.html. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 108. 
§§§§§§§ Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1371. Coates found that it had 
a statistically significant positive correlation with his “Contestability Index” dependent variable, which 
represented the number of days it would take for a hostile bidder to overcome management resistance to a 
bid. However, he did not find a significant correlation between a founding CEO and a classified board. 
********  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAW & 
ECON 301, 314 (1983). It is easy to see why a board led by management may not hold management 
accountable. 
†††††††† Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1871. This finding was statistically significant.   27 
I also account for the age of the CEO at the time of the IPO. Field and Karpoff 
hypothesized that the present value of personal pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of 
control over a company is inversely related to the CEO’s age. This assumes that older 
CEOs are more likely to leave the workforce sooner and therefore will not be able to 
enjoy the private benefits of control as much as a younger CEO would be able to enjoy 
them.  Indeed,  they  did  find  such  a  negative  relationship  between  CEO  age  and  the 
likelihood of a takeover defense.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Finally, I look at the percentage of a company’s common stock that is owned by 
directors and officers before the IPO. Under SEC regulations, a company is required to 
furnish the aggregate total percentage of stock beneficially owned by all directors and 
executive  officers  in  its  registration  statement.
§§§§§§§§ The  management  entrenchment 
hypothesis  suggests  that  the  portion  of  the  costs  of  takeover  defenses  born  by 
management decreases as their equity position in the company decreases. Therefore, one 
may expect a negative relationship between insider stock ownership and the presence of 
takeover defenses.  
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Id. 
§§§§§§§§ See I t e m  4 0 3  ( S e c u r i t y  o w n e r s h i p  o f  c e r t a i n  b e n e f i c i a l  o w n e r s  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t )  o f  
Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.403.   28 
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III.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
A.  Dependent Variables 
Initial data on the IPOs was retrieved through the Thomson Financial Securities 
Data Company (SDC) Platinum New Issues database. For each company in the sample, 
data on the presence of takeover defenses was collected from FactSet’s SharkRepellent 
database and supplemented with data from the IRRC Governance database. Additional 
data  was  manually  collected  data  from  issuers’  registration  statements,  charters,  and 
bylaws,
********* which companies are required to file with the SEC (and available online 
via the SEC’s EDGAR database). 
1.  Effective staggered board. 
Most previous studies of takeover defenses often focus on the mere presence of a 
classified board without giving weight to whether the classification is effective when 
facing a hostile bidder. It is not entirely uncommon for companies to have ineffective 
staggered boards as a result of gaffes in defensive planning.
††††††††† Therefore, I use a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of an effective staggered board (“ESB”) as my 
primary  dependent  variable.  ESB  data  was  compiled  in  accordance  with  Bebchuk, 
Coates,  and  Subramanian.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ In  short,  an  ESB  exists  when  a  theoretical  hostile 
acquirer with a simple majority of the vote cannot overcome a target’s staggered board in 
less than two annual elections. To be classified as an ESB, first, the charter for each 
company was reviewed to see if it included a classified board.
§§§§§§§§§ If the classified 
board  appeared  in  the  bylaws  instead  of  the  charter,  then  there  must  have  been  a 
supermajority (66⅔ percent) requirement to amend the bylaws in order for the board to 
be classified as an ESB. Second, the charter must not allow for the removal of directors 
without  cause  or  must  require  a  supermajority  of  the  shareholder  vote  to  remove  a 
director without cause. If the charter is silent on the issue then the default law of the 
company’s state of incorporation comes into play. (If it was a Delaware company, the 
default law prohibits removal of directors without cause.
********** If it was another state 
                                                 
*********  As the SharkRepellant data is regularly updated, I also checked its data on charter and 
bylaw amendments to ensure that the sample includes the data as of the IPO date and excludes subsequent 
changes.  
††††††††† See Kallick v. SandRidge Energy, Inc., CIV.A. 8182-CS, 2013 WL 868942 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
8, 2013) (describing a staggered board implemented by bylaw as a “defensive planning flaw”). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ BCS, Effective Staggered Boards, supra note ****, at 913. 
§§§§§§§§§ See  Chesapeake  Corp.  v.  Shore,  771  A.2d  293,  346  (Del.  Ch.  2000)  (finding  that 
stockholders have the power to eliminate classified board structures embedded in the bylaws). 
**********  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k); BCS, Effective Staggered Boards, supra note ****, 
at 910.   30 
then  the  default  law  generally  allowed  removal  without  cause.
††††††††††)  Additionally, 
shareholders must not be able to “pack the board” by increasing the number of directors 
and filling the vacancies created.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Therefore, charters and bylaws were reviewed to 
see if directors had the right to fill all board vacancies and if shareholders had the right to 
increase the size of the board. If such provisions were exclusively located in the bylaws 
and subject to amendment by a simple majority vote of shareholders, then the board was 
not considered an ESB. Finally, a company’s board must have had the ability to adopt a 
poison pill without shareholder approval—or have already adopted a pill—in order to be 
classified as an ESB.
§§§§§§§§§§  
2.   E-Index. 
An alternative measure of takeover defenses is the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
entrenchment index (E-Index). Each company in the sample was given a score, between 
zero and five, based on the number of provisions that the company had at the time of its 
IPO.
*********** The relevant provisions were: (1) a classified board; (2) a provision limiting 
shareholders’  ability  through  majority  vote  to  amend  the  corporate  bylaws;  (3)  a 
provision limiting shareholders’ ability through majority vote to amend the corporate 
charter; (4) a requirement that requires more than a majority of shareholders to approve a 
merger; and (5) the ability of the board to adopt a “morning-after” poison pill.
††††††††††† 
While Bebchuk et al.’s original E-Index considers whether a board has a poison pill in 
place, my modified version merely considers whether it is possible for a board to adopt a 
poison  pill  without  shareholder  approval.  (It  is  irrelevant  whether  or  not  a  company 
actually has a pill in place if it can adopt a “morning-after” poison pill as soon as it is 
faced with a hostile bid.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡) This requires that the board be authorized to issue blank 
check preferred stock and that the company’s charter did not have an “anti-poison pill” 
provision or a requirement for shareholders to approve a poison pill prior to its adoption. 
3.  Dual class stock. 
                                                 
†††††††††† See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08; BCS, Effective Staggered Boards, supra note ****, at 
910. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ BCS,  Effective Staggered Boards,  supra n o t e  ****,  at  910  n.84.  If  a  charter  did  not 
reserve the size of the board to the board directors, then shareholders can increase the size of the board. If 
shareholders can also fill vacancies, then they can pack the board. See DEL. CODE ANN.. tit. 8, § 141(b), § 
142(e); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(a), § 8.10(a). 
§§§§§§§§§§ A board that is authorized to issue blank-check preferred stock can adopt a pill unless the 
charter prohibits it.  
***********  See generally Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note ******* (introducing the E-Index). 
††††††††††† While  the  original  E-Index  utilizes  6  provisions,  I  did  not  include  the  presence  of  a 
“golden parachute” in my calculations because such provisions are rare at IPO companies. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 288 (2000); Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 86.   31 
  A potent takeover defense that can substitute for a classified board is a dual class 
capital structure where management or pre-IPO shareholders hold a controlling class of 
high-vote stock. Dual class capital structures are “qualitatively different from other types 
of defenses.”
§§§§§§§§§§§ In such a structure, one class of shares can have superior voting 
rights (“supervoting” shares) to another class that has ordinary voting rights (one share, 
one vote).
************ Entrepreneurs, venture capital and private equity firms, and other pre-
IPO insiders typically hold on to the shares with superior voting rights after the IPO in 
order to maintain effective control over the firm (even though they may no longer own a 
majority of its stock).
†††††††††††† The ordinary shares are typically sold to outside investors 
during  the  IPO.  By  maintaining  a  controlling  vote  of  the  stock,  the  insider  is  fully 
insulated  from  the  takeover  market.  Therefore,  a  classified  board  is  not  necessary  to 
frustrate  hostile  bidders  in  firms  with  dual  class  structures  including  a  “supervoting” 
(control) class. 
Registration statements were reviewed to see whether a company had multiple 
classes of common stock at the IPO. An IPO was flagged as having an effective dual 
class control structure (DualClassControl=1) if the stock being sold was lower vote stock 
than  the  stock  held  by  the  largest  pre-IPO  shareholder,  or  if  no  vote  stock  is  being 
sold.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  
B.  Independent Variables of Interest 
1.  Law firm hypotheses. 
The identity of the law firm serving as primary counsel for each IPO company 
and of their corresponding office locations was taken from the SDC New Issues database. 
If multiple law firms were listed in SDC, I identified primary counsel by reviewing the 
registration statement to see which firm was listed first and issued an opinion on the 
legality of the offering.
§§§§§§§§§§§§  
Law  firm  M&A  experience  is  primarily  represented  by  two  variables:  Target 
Deals and Acquirer Deals. Target Deals is equal to the number of deals that the issuer’s 
law firm served as primary counsel to a public target company in the three-year period 
                                                 
§§§§§§§§§§§ Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1383. 
************  See generally Thomas J. Chemmanur & Yawen Jiao, Dual class IPOs: A theoretical 
analysis, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 305, 305 (2012). 
†††††††††††† Coates found that companies offering high private benefits of control and those owned 
by  individuals  or  families  were  more  likely  to  adopt d u a l  c l a s s  c o n t r o l  s t r u c t u r e s .  C o a t e s ,  Blame the 
Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1368. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Coates Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1357. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§ This legal opinion can be found as Exhibit 5 to a Registration Statement (S-1) and is 
required by the SEC. Item 601 (Exhibits) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601.   32 
prior to the IPO. Acquirer Deals is equal to the number of deals that the issuer’s law firm 
served as primary counsel to a public company acquirer in the same period. This data was 
extracted from the SDC Platinum Merger & Acquisition database. In order to focus on 
deals that involved some risk of a hostile bid, deals were only included if they involved 
majority acquisitions of public companies lacking controlling shareholders with a market 
capitalization of at least $10 million (consistent with Coates). 
A law firm was flagged as a Silicon Valley firm (Silicon Valley Law=1) if the 
registration statement indicated the law firm was located in Silicon Valley
************* and 
was flagged as New York firm (NY Law=1) if it was located in New York, NY. Data on 
the total number of the lawyers working at a firm was primarily taken from the American 
Lawyer’s 2012 AmLaw200 publication. For smaller firms not included in the top 200, 
data was manually collected from the NALP Directory of Legal Employers or the law 
firm’s  website.  IPOLAW  represents  the  number  of  IPOs  in  the  sample  for  which  a 
company’s law firm served as primary counsel. 
2.  Private equity & venture capital hypotheses. 
  The presence of venture capital and private equity backing are indicated through 
the  use  of  categorical  variables.  Private Equity  is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  a 
company is backed by a private equity firm at the time of its IPO. Venture Capital is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a company is backed a venture capital firm at the time of its 
IPO.  
  To construct these variables, I reviewed the final registration statement for each 
IPO and recorded the top three institutional shareholders and their stakes. In order to 
minimize  measurement  error,  I  primarily  relied  on  an  external  source  to  classify  the 
shareholders. I searched for each firm in the Dow Jones Private Equity & Venture Capital 
database and recorded whether Dow Jones labeled a firm a venture capital firm or a 
buyout/private  equity  firm.
††††††††††††† If  a  company’s  top  two  shareholders  are  both  a 
private  equity  and  venture  capital  firm  owning  significant  and  similar  stakes,  the 
company is classified as being backed by both. Lastly, I separately noted whether one of 
the top three shareholders was a mutual fund or public pension fund. 
3.  Management entrenchment hypothesis. 
CEO-Founder is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also a founder of the 
company. CEO-Chair is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO also serves as the 
                                                 
*************  In  the  sample,  Silicon  Valley  law  firms  were  those  in  Palo  Alto,  Mountain  View, 
Redwood City, Menlo Park, or San Francisco, California. 
††††††††††††† The SDC New Issue database also had flags for IPOs backed by venture capital and 
private equity firms. However, the SDC flags were often inaccurate and inconsistent.   33 
chairman of the board. CEO Age is the age of the CEO at the time of the IPO. Insider is 
the percentage of a company’s common stock that is owned by directors and officers 
before the IPO. I collected information on CEO-Founder, CEO-Chair, and CEO-Age by 
examining  the  “Management”  section  of  the  registration  statement  of  each 
company.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
C.  Other Explanatory and Control Variables 
Basic IPO data, such as the market capitalization of the company (Market Cap.), 
the size of the offering as a percentage of the market capitalization (IPO Float), the assets 
at  the  time  of  the  IPO  (Assets),  whether  the  IPO  was  a  RLBO  or  spin-off 
(Spinoff),
§§§§§§§§§§§§§ the year of the offering, and other financial data at the time of the 
offering,  came  from  the  SDC  New  Issues  database.  This  data  was  amended  and 
supplemented by Jay Ritter’s Corrections to SDC’s IPO database file,
************** and his 
data  on  IPOs w i t h  multiple  share  classes  outstanding.
††††††††††††††  For  multivariate 
regressions, Market Cap is an important control variable as firms with a smaller market 
capitalization are more likely to be acquired because there are inherent impediments and 
complexities to acquiring larger companies.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
Company Age was calculated using founding date data from SDC, and amended 
by Jay Ritter’s IPO founding date spreadsheet.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ It serves as a proxy for more 
mature firms, which likely have more tangible assets, more seasoned management, and a 
lower  potential  for  growth.
*************** The  location  of  a  firm’s  headquarters  was  also 
assembled  from  SDC.  Delaware,  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  a  firm  is 
incorporated in Delaware was created using data from each prospectus. As the default 
law  in  states  other  than  Delaware  generally  leaves  companies  less  vulnerable  to 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ I reviewed company websites and other external sources if a company did not name a 
chairman in the registration statement. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Spinoff data was supplemented with a manual review of registration statements. 
**************  Jay  Ritter,  Corrections  to  SDC  (Dec.  28,  2011), 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/SDC%20corrections122811.pdf. 
†††††††††††††† Jay Ritter, IPOs from 1980 - April 2012 with Multiple Share Classes Outstanding (May 
2012), http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/dualclassIPOs19802012_052012.xls (accessed Jan. 20, 2013). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ E.g., Hamid Mehran & Stavros Peristiani, Financial Visibility and the Decision to Go 
Private, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 519, 529 (2010). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Laura C. Field & Jay Ritter, Founding dates for 9,262 firms going public in the U.S. 
during  1975-2010 ( J a n .  2 0 1 1 ) ,  h t t p : / / b e a r . w a r r i n g t o n . u f l . e d u / r i t t e r / F o u n d i n g D a t e s . h t m  ( as  used  in T i m  
Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?, 33(3) FIN. MGMT. 5 (2004); 
Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1857.  
***************  C.  N.  V.  Krishnan  et  al.,  Venture Capital Reputation, Post-IPO Performance, and 
Corporate Governance, 46 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 1295, 1303 (2011).   34 
takeovers,
††††††††††††††† Delaware companies likely pay more attention to takeover defense 
issues than companies incorporated in other states.  
Standard industrial classification (“SIC”) codes were obtained through the SDC 
New Issues database. Companies were classified as belonging to a “high-tech” industry 
(HIGHTECH=1) if their three-digit SIC indicated they were in the computer equipment 
(357), software (737), electronics (367), medical instruments (384), and biotech (283 & 
809)  industries.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The  number  of  acquisitions i n  each  IPO  firm’s  industry 
(Industry M&A) was calculated by totaling the number of acquisitions involving targets 
with  the  same  3-digit  SIC  code  as  the  IPO  firm  in  the  three  years  prior  to  the 
IPO.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Higher levels of takeover activity in an industry are likely to increase the 
visibility  of  antitakeover  provisions  to  company  management  and  financial  sponsors. 
This,  in  turn,  may  increase  their  desire  for  takeover  defenses  irrespective  of  their 
efficiency. 
Registration statements were reviewed to see whether a company had multiple 
classes of common stock at the IPO (DualClass=1). An IPO was flagged as having an 
effective dual class structure (DualClassControl=1) if the stock being sold was lower 
vote stock than the stock held by the largest pre-IPO shareholder, or if “no vote” stock is 
being sold.
****************   
D.  Description of Empirical Sample   
The sample contains 259 initial public offerings (IPOs) for U.S. companies that 
occurred between January 2008 and December 2012.. The sample excludes IPOs with an 
offer price below one dollar, IPOs that did not take place on a U.S. exchange, and IPOs 
                                                 
††††††††††††††† Compare  MASS.  GEN.  LAWS  ANN. c h .  1 5 6 D ,  §  8 . 0 6  ( d )  ( a l l o w i n g  a  b o a rd  to 
effectively  classify  itself  without  a  shareholder  vote)  and  MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §  3-602 
(prohibiting business combination transactions with a 10% shareholder for a period of 5 years unless board 
approval is obtained before the 10% threshold is crossed) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (prohibiting 
business combinations transactions with a 15% shareholder for a period of only 3 years and providing 
numerous exceptions). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Coates,  Blame the Lawyers,  supra note  †††††††††††††††,  at  1365  n.201 ( “ T h e s e  
industries drive Silicon Valley.”). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See id. at 1349. As with Acquirer Deals and Target Deals, in order to focus on deals 
that  involved  some  risk  of  a  hostile  bid,  transactions  were  only  counted  if  they  involved  majority 
acquisitions of public companies lacking controlling shareholders with a market capitalization of at least 
$10 million.  
****************  See id. at 1357.   35 
for closed-end funds, trusts, real estate investment trusts (REITs), and Special Purpose 
Acquisition Companies (SPACs).
††††††††††††††††  
D.  Qualitative Data 
  Although I primarily rely on empirical research throughout this paper, I also make 
use of qualitative data. At points in the paper, I utilize governance and proxy voting 
policies of institutional investors. The SEC requires mutual funds to disclose their proxy 
voting policies, procedures, and records
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ and I retrieved this data from funds’ 
websites  and  SEC  filings.  I  also  conducted  numerous  unscripted  interviews  with 
practitioners  with  experience  related  to  IPOs.  The  interviewees  included  partners  at 
M&A–focused law firms, including Wachtell Lipton and Sullivan & Cromwell, partners 
at private equity law firm Schulte Roth & Zabel, a managing partner at a venture and 
startup-focused law firm, and numerous principals at private equity and venture capital 
funds based in Silicon Valley, New York, and Boston. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A.  Descriptive Data 
1.  Issuer characteristics. 
  The sample includes of a wide range of well-known issuers such as Facebook, 
General  Motors,  Zipcar,  and  Visa.  Table  2  lists  the  summary  statistics  for  the  entire 
sample of 259 IPO issuers. A massive 27% of the companies had their headquarters 
located in California, up from 21% in the early 1990s.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Meanwhile, 10% were 
headquartered in Texas. Only 4% had headquarters in New York—representing a 60% 
decline since the Coates study.
*****************  While only one company was headquartered 
in Delaware, 91% of the companies were incorporated in Delaware. This follows the 
growing trend observed in the Coates study, which found that 62% of IPO companies 
                                                 
†††††††††††††††† This condensation of the dataset is consistent with previous literature. See, e.g., Paul 
A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United 
States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1055 (2010); Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1859. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Disclosure  of  Proxy  Voting  Policies  and  Proxy  Voting  Records  by  Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 CFR pts. 239, 
249, 279 & 274 (2013)). The SEC believed that disclosure would “illuminate potential conflicts of interest 
and discourage voting that is inconsistent with fund shareholders’ best interests” and that increasing the 
transparency of proxy voting by funds would lead funds to become more engaged in corporate governance 
issues. Id. at 6566.   
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1353. 
*****************  See id.   36 
were incorporated in Delaware in 1991–92 and 75% were in 1998–99.
††††††††††††††††† This 
is  prima  facie  evidence  of  Delaware’s  continued  dominance  over  corporate  law, 
irrespective of whether this is due to a “race-to-the-top”
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ or a “race-to-the-
bottom.”
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
                                                 
†††††††††††††††††  Id. at 1377. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of 
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that state competition for corporate law is efficient 
because it produces high quality law); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 
VA. L. REV. 111 (1987). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ See,  e.g.,  William  C.  Cary,  Federalism  and  Corporate  Law:  Reflections  Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (hypothesizing that state competition will result in in a choice of 
inefficient  law);  Lucian  A.  Bebchuk,  Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1509 (1992).   37 
 
TABLE 2 
Forty-two percent (42%) of the companies are part of “high-tech” industries. Of 
the high-tech companies, 55% are software companies. The software industry also had 
Summary Statistics for the Complete Sample 
  Mean or % 
positive 
Median  St. dev.  Min  Max 
Panel A: Company Headquarters            
California  27%  --  --  0  1 
Massachusetts  6%  --  --  0  1 
New York  4%  --  --  0  1 
Texas  10%  --  --  0  1 
           
Panel B: Company Industry           
High Tech  42%  --  --  0  1 
Software  23%  --  --  0  1 
Medical  3%  --  --  0  1 
M&A in Industry  37.38  12  45.04  0  156 
           
Panel C: Company Size and Offering Information  
Assets ($M before offering)  1893.5  184.2  9304.3  0.2  137238 
Market Cap ($M)  1455.3  464.0  6024.0  31.6  81247.2 
Percentage of shares sold in IPO  31.82%  27.66%  19.84%  17%  100% 
Primary offering as a percentage of 
total offering 
77%  88%  29%  0  1 
NYSE Listed  46%  --  --  0  1 
Spinoff  8%  --  --  0  1 
Reverse LBO  34%  --  --  0  1 
           
Panel D: Other Company Information 
Company Age (years)  16.6  10  21  0  157 
Delaware Incorporated  91%  --  --  0  1 
           
Panel E: Company Management            
CEO is chairman  45%  --  --  0  1 
CEO is founder  36%  --  --  0  1 
CEO’s age  51.4  51.0  8.3  27  86 
Insider Ownership  50.0%  53.3%  32%  0  100 
           
Panel F: Issuer Law Firm           
New York City law firm  26%  --  --  0  1 
Silicon Valley law firm  23%  --  --  0  1 
Law firm acquirer rep. (#)   18.2  12.0  19.7  0  80 
Law firm target rep. (#)  22.6  17.0  22.1  0  105 
# of issuers represented   7.6  6.0  6.7  1  23 
Law firm size (# lawyers)  969.4  754.0  746.9  3  3805 
           
Panel G: Financial Sponsors           
Private Equity  46%  --  --  0  1 
Venture Capital  43%  --  --  0  1   38 
the most M&A transactions in the three years leading up to an IPO, reaching a peak of 
156 transactions. However, the median level of M&A activity in an industry was only 12 
transactions. In fact, 12.4% of the companies are in industries that had no M&A activity 
prior to their IPOs.  
On average, an issuer had $1.9 billion in total assets before the offering. This is a 
sizeable increase from the average total assets after an offering of $212 million reported 
by Daines and Klausner just ten years ago.
******************  However, the total assets for 
individual companies varied markedly ($9.3 billion standard deviation), ranging from 
$200,000 in assets for Ventrus Biosciences Inc. (VTUS) to over $137 billion for General 
Motors Co. (GM). The average market capitalization before an offering ($1.5 billion) is 
also much higher than what was found in previous studies ($211.7 million). 
The median company issued shares constituting 88% of the offering—an almost 
identical amount to what was found ten years ago.
††††††††††††††††††  The average percentage 
of  total  shares  offered  in  an  IPO  is  31.8%,  also  in  line  with  what  previous  studies 
found.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Forty-six percent (46%) of companies chose to list their stocks on the 
New  York  Stock  Exchange.  Almost  all  of  the  rest  were  listed  on  the  NASDAQ 
exchange.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The median company was founded 10 years prior to the IPO. As 
this is virtually unchanged from the median age of 9 years that Coates observes in the 
early 1990s, it does not appear that companies today are waiting longer before going 
public.  
Eight percent (8%) of the IPOs are spinoffs from corporate parents. A staggering 
34% are reverse leveraged buyouts (“RLBO”)—meaning that the IPO companies had 
previously been bought out and taken private by private equity investors.
*******************  
(In the early 1990s, only 19% of IPOs were an RLBO.)
†††††††††††††††††††  Fifteen companies 
(6%) have been acquired since their IPO, with the transactions completed in a mean of 22 
months after the IPO.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
2.  Issuer management. 
                                                 
******************  Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 93. 
††††††††††††††††††  See id. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  See id. (reporting that 35% of shares were sold, on average, in an IPO); Field & 
Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1860 (reporting a mean of 32.5% and a median of 31.1%).  
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Two companies were listed on the American Stock Exchange, which was acquired 
by the NYSE in 2008. 
*******************  Cao & Lerner, supra note †††††††††††††††††††††††, at 139. 
†††††††††††††††††††  Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1352. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Post-IPO acquisition data is from FactSet’s MergerMetrics database. As of Mar. 7, 
2013, acquisitions of another 6 companies in the sample have been announced but not yet completed.   39 
Panel  E  of  Table  2presents  data  on  the  CEO  and  management  of  the  sample 
companies. While the average CEO is fifty-one years old at the time of the IPO, there are 
some amusing outliers. The youngest CEO was Mark Zuckerberg, who took Facebook 
public when he was just twenty-seven years old. At the other end of the spectrum, Dole’s 
CEO (David Murdock) was eighty-six at its IPO and has served in that position for over 
24 years.  In a little less than half (45%) of the companies, the CEO also serves as 
chairman  of  the  board.  Additionally,  around  one  third  (36%)  of  the  CEOs  are  also 
founders of their companies.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ The mean director and officer ownership prior 
to the IPO is 50% but ranges from as little as 0% to as much as 100% of the shares. 
3.  Law firms. 
The sample shows that the market for corporate legal services is not nearly as 
fragmented as it was twenty years ago. Two hundred and fifty nine (259) companies 
relied on 84 different law firms to serve as legal counsel for their IPOs. Even though this 
sample includes 100 more companies than the Coates early 1990s sample, it shows that 
27 less law firms were used overall.
********************  This likely is a result of consolidation 
in the legal industry
††††††††††††††††††††  and the liquidation of some law firms in the wake of 
the dot-com bubble.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ The top five law firms in the sample represented 74 
companies, accounting for 28.5% of the sample. This also reveals defragmentation in the 
legal market, as Coates found that the top ten law firms did not even account for one third 
of  his  sample.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ However,  Wilson  Sonsini  Goodrich  &  Rosati  (“Wilson 
Sonsini”) still captured more of the IPO market than any other law firm, representing 23 
companies.
*********************  A given law firm served as counsel for a mean of 7.6 IPOs.  
Consistent with the consolidation of the legal industry, the number of lawyers 
employed by a given law firm has grown exponentially over the past twenty years. For 
the entire sample of IPOs, the mean size in 2012 is 969 lawyers and is as high as 3,805 
lawyers (DLA Piper and Baker & McKenzie both employ over 3,700 lawyers). This 
mean  is  larger  than  the  number  employed  by  all  but  two  law  firms  in  the  1990s 
                                                 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  This declined from 48% in the early 1990s. See Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra 
note †††††††††††††††, at 1352. 
********************  See id. at 1354 (finding that 160 companies used 111 different law firms). 
††††††††††††††††††††  E.g., Peter Lattman, The Publicly Traded Law Firm, WSJ LAW BLOG, Mar. 30, 
2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/03/30/the-publicly-traded-law-firm-2/. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  For example, Brobeck Phleger, a law firm that represented the third most IPO 
companies in the Coates study, was liquidate in 2003 after it lost money in the dot-com bubble. See Todd 
Wallack  &  Harriet  Chiang,  Top  S.F.  dot-com  law  firm  to  close,  S.F.  CHRON.,  Jan.  31,  2003, 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Top-S-F-dot-com-law-firm-to-close-Brobeck-2675897.php. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See Coates,  Blame the Lawyers,  supra note  †††††††††††††††,  at  1354.  In  my 
sample, the top seven law firms account for 36% of the IPOs. 
*********************  See infra Table 3.   40 
sample.
†††††††††††††††††††††  Panel  F  of  Table  2  indicates  that  law  firms  still  appear  to  be 
geographically concentrated. The IPO market share of New York City law firms has 
declined from 30% to 26% over the last twenty years while the market share of Silicon 
Valley law firms has increased fourfold from 6% to 23%.  
The public M&A experience of the law firms in the sample varies considerably. 
The mean (22.6) and median (17) number of deals for which a law firm represented an 
M&A target is larger than the respective mean (18.2) and median (12) number of acquirer 
representations. The overall M&A experience for IPO counsel also fluctuates, ranging 
from no experience at all to Skadden’s participation in 185 M&A transactions in the three 
years  prior  to  some  IPOs.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Despite  the  magnitude  of  Skadden’s  M&A 
transactions, the overall M&A indices are not skewed by any one firm’s activity. 
4.  Private equity and venture capital.  
As  indicated  in  Panel  G,  private  equity  firms  back  46%  of  companies  in  the 
sample,  while  venture  capital  firms  back  43%  of  the  companies  at  the  time  of  their 
IPOs.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ This highlights how the role of private equity and venture capital 
funds in the IPO market has increased over the past decade. In the late 1990s, only 29% 
of IPOs were backed by private equity funds,
**********************  and throughout that entire 
decade,  the  frequency  of  venture  capital  backing  remained  unchanged  at 
34%.
††††††††††††††††††††††  
5.  Takeover defenses. 
  Of the 259 IPOs in the sample, 97.3% of companies are able to adopt a “morning-
after” poison pill should a takeover threat emerge. All but five companies are authorized 
to  issue  blank  check  preferred  stock  while  two  companies  have  “anti-poison  pill” 
provisions,  which  prohibit  the  adoption  of  a  poison  pill  without  prior  stockholder 
approval, in their charters. Such explicit anti-takeover provisions are extremely rare and 
were  nonexistent  in  previous  studies.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Three  of  the  companies 
incorporated  in  Delaware  (1%)  have  expanded  constituency  provisions  that  allow 
                                                 
†††††††††††††††††††††  See Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1356. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Coincidentally, Skadden worked on an almost identical number of transactions 
(185) in the Coates study. See id. at 1355. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Thirteen companies were classified as being backed by both venture capital and 
private equity firms. 
**********************  Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 92. 
††††††††††††††††††††††  Id.; Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1352 (35% in 
the early 1990s). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  E.g., Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1357 (finding 
that no company explicitly prohibited a poison pill); Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 95 
(finding that no firm limited the authority of management to adopt a poison pill).   41 
directors  to  consider  non-shareholder  constituencies  when  evaluating  takeover 
bids.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ As there will always arguably be some constituency that would find 
a takeover to be detrimental, Daines and Klausner convincingly note that these provisions 
give  management  “expansive  authority  to  resist  a  hostile  bid  that  would  benefit 
shareholders.”
***********************  Sixteen percent (16%) of the sample companies have dual 
class structures. While Coates observed that the frequency of dual class capital structures 
declined  from  11%  of  IPOs  in  1992  to  6%  in  1999,  it  appears  that  the  trend  has 
drastically  reversed.
†††††††††††††††††††††††  Such  structures  are  accompanied  by  sales  of  the 
class  of  stock  with  lower  (or  no)  votes  in  ten  (9%)  of  the  IPOs,  virtually  the  same 
percentage as in the sample from the early 1990s (8%).
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡   
As  previously  discussed,  pre-IPO  decisions  on  takeover  defenses  are  crucial 
because it is almost impossible for a public company to adopt takeover defenses such as a 
classified board once it goes public. Moreover, institutional shareholders have increased 
their  efforts  to  declassify  the  boards  of  public  companies  and  have  been  extremely 
successful.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ As classified boards are a dying breed in public companies, 
and as companies therefore know that they will likely face pressure to declassify once 
public, it is worth considering whether firms are increasingly adopting a potent substitute 
takeover defense—dual class stock with unequal voting rights—in lieu of a classified 
board.  
 
FIGURE 2 
Dual Class Structures by Year 
                                                 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Field and Karpoff’s study of IPOs between 1988 and 1992 found that 4% of IPO 
firms included such a provision. Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1861. 
***********************  Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 97. 
†††††††††††††††††††††††  See Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1353. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Id. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See supra Part II.A.2 for a review of declassification trends.   42 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that the use of dual class stock has generally increased from 
2008 to 2012. However, the increase is rather small compared to what one would expect 
if dual class control structures were being used to substitute for classified boards. 
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FIGURE 3 
Percentage of IPOs with Classified Boards
************************  
 
Out of the 237 firms in the sample that are not subject to low-vote dual class 
structures, 177 (75%) have a classified board. As illustrated in Figure 3, there has been a 
drastic increase the use of classified boards as only 36% of IPOs in the early 1990s and 
44% of IPOs in 1994 to 1997 included a classified board. This evidence is generally 
consistent with Bebchuk’s hypothesis that lawyers recommend takeover defenses because 
it  produces  the  smallest  likelihood  that  their  clients  would  complain  about  the  legal 
advice received in preparation for the IPO.
††††††††††††††††††††††††  It is also possible that this 
massive  increase  the  incidence  of  classification  is  an  unintended  result  of  staunch 
shareholder opposition to the adoption of takeover defenses in already-public companies. 
Because managers know that their shareholders will never approve defenses mid-stream, 
they may seek to include defenses such as a classified board at the IPO. In fact, two 
companies in the sample (SPS Commerce and Visa) that went public with classified 
boards have since successfully brought management proposals to declassify their boards. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the prevalence of classified boards peaked at over 82% 
between 1999 and 2002 and has somewhat receded since then. As Bebchuk’s hypothesis 
does not predict such a decline, it cannot fully explain the trend.  
Of the 177 classified boards, only 149 (63% of the sample) can be considered 
“effective.” This is because 28 companies had mechanisms in place that would render 
any classified board illusory, such as provisions allowing shareholders to pack the board, 
                                                 
************************  1988-92 data is from Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1858. 1994-97 
data is from Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 96. 1998-99 data is from Coates, Blame the 
Lawyers,  supra  note  †††††††††††††††,  at  1376–77.  A  missing  column  indicates  that  data  was  not 
available. 2002 data is from Joanne Allegra, SharkRepellent.net, IPO Year in Review 2002 (Jan. 6, 2003), 
http://www.sharkrepellent.net/pub/rs_20030106.shtml. 
††††††††††††††††††††††††  Bebchuk, supra note ***************, at 738. 
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to  remove  directors  without  cause  with  a  simple  majority  vote,  or  because  the 
classification only exists in the bylaws. 
B.  Mean Comparisons and Univariate Regressions 
1.  Law firm identity and M&A experience. 
The identity of issuer counsel appears to affect takeover defenses, consistent with 
the Coates study.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Table 3 displays the frequency of board classification, 
ESBs, and dual stock control structures in IPO companies advised by the top 20 law firms 
(ranked by the number of times they appeared as counsel in the sample). Companies 
advised by 5 law firms—Wilson Sonsini, Gunderson Dettmer, Gibson Dunn, Davis Polk, 
and  Vinson  &  Elkins—went  public  with  a  classified  board  100%  of  the  time.  This 
contrasts with the Coates finding that firms advised by Wilson Sonsini in the early 1990s 
almost never had a classified board, and by the end of the decade, only 25% of their 
clients  had  a  classified  board.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ Companies  advised  by  2  law  firms—
Gunderson Dettmer and Davis Polk—even had an effective staggered board 100% of the 
time while 6 other law firms took at least 80% of clients public with an ESB. While all of 
the companies advised by Vinson & Elkins went public with a classified board, none of 
those boards were effectively classified. On the other end of the spectrum, no client of 
Akin Gump in the sample went public with a classified board or a dual class control 
structure.  
Certain  law  firms  that  predominantly  represent  targets  in  public  M&A 
transactions, such as Wilson Sonsini, WilmerHale, and Goodwin Procter, almost always 
install effective staggered boards in IPO clients. In contrast, issuers using law firms—
Simpson Thacher, Kirkland & Ellis, and Weil Gotshal—that primarily represent M&A 
acquirers appear to adopt ESBs less often. It is worth noting that with one exception—
Gunderson Dettmer, which only worked on 1 M&A transaction—law firms in the sample 
have much more M&A experience than they did in the early 1990s. For example, the IPO 
leader, Wilson Sonsini, had worked on average of 45 total M&A transactions in the three 
years  prior  to  an  IPO  in  the  sample  versus  only  12  transactions  in  the  Coates 
study.
*************************  
 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1360. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Id. 
*************************  Id. at 1356.   45 
 
TABLE 3 
Defenses by Top Law Firms (by # of IPOs) 
 
Some law firms also appear to have strong relationships with certain types of 
financial sponsors. One hundred percent (100%) of the IPO clients of Simpson Thacher, 
Weil Gotshal, and Davis Polk and 91% of the clients of Kirkland & Ellis were backed by 
private equity funds. Similarly, 100% of the IPO clients of Fenwick & West, Goodwin 
Procter, and Gunderson Dettmer and 91% of the clients of Wilson Sonsini were backed 
by venture capital funds. 
Client Takeover Defenses  M&A  Backing 
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Wilson Sonsini  Palo Alto  23  100%  91%  3.78  9%  13  32  17%  91% 
Latham & Watkins  New York  18  89%  72%  3.50  11%  63  73  47%  53% 
Cooley   Palo Alto  12  75%  75%  3.50  8%  12  19  0%  83% 
Kirkland & Ellis  Chicago  11  55%  45%  3.00  0%  34  21  91%  18% 
WilmerHale  D.C.  11  91%  91%  3.73  18%  5  17  36%  55% 
Simpson Thacher  New York  10  50%  20%  2.00  0%  45  36  100%  0% 
Fenwick & West  
Mountain 
View  9  78%  78%  3.33  33%  5  13  11%  100% 
Goodwin Procter   Boston  9  89%  89%  3.78  0%  11  11  33%  100% 
Pillsbury Winthrop 
San 
Francisco  8  63%  63%  3.13  0%  3  13  38%  63% 
Skadden  New York  8  63%  50%  2.63  13%  66  82  75%  0% 
DLA Piper  New York  7  86%  86%  3.86  0%  15  20  57%  57% 
Gunderson Dettmer  Menlo Park  6  100%  100%  4.00  0%  1  0  0%  100% 
Wachtell Lipton  New York  6  83%  67%  2.50  0%  25  33  83%  0% 
Gibson Dunn  Los Angeles  5  100%  80%  3.80  0%  20  41  60%  20% 
Ropes & Gray  Boston  5  80%  80%  3.60  20%  16  13  60%  40% 
Weil Gotshal  New York  5  40%  40%  2.20  0%  40  28  100%  0% 
Davis Polk  New York  4  100%  100%  3.75  25%  36  32  25%  50% 
Vinson & Elkins   Houston  4  100%  0%  3.25  0%  14  11  100%  0% 
Akin Gump  D.C.  3  0%  0%  2.33  0%  6  10  67%  0% 
Cravath  New York  3  33%  0%  1.33  33%  34  33  0%  0%   46 
 
TABLE 4 
ESB Incidence by Law Firm’s M&A Role 
    Law Firm Target M&A Experience  
  Q1  IQR  Q3 
Q1  49% 
(n=43) 
 
71% 
(n=7)  -- 
IQR  67% 
(n=12) 
70% 
(n=100) 
 
82% 
(n=17) 
 
 
 
 
Law Firm 
Acquirer M&A 
Experience 
Q3 
-- 
52% 
(n=21) 
 
54% 
(n=37) 
Note:  Firms with dual class capital structures in which lower or no vote stock is sold (Dual Class 
Control=1) are excluded from this table. 
  Law firms’ experience in specific roles in M&A transactions also appears to help 
explain  the  variance  in  the  adoption  of  effective  staggered  boards  in  Table  4.  After 
holding acquirer-side experience constant, ESB incidence increases as law firms’ target-
side  M&A  experience  (Law  Target  Deals)  increases.  And  after  holding  target-side 
experience constant, acquirer-side M&A experience (Law Acquirer Deals) is generally 
associated with a decrease in ESB incidence. This result supports the Law Firm Role 
hypothesis, which predicted that a law firm’s type of M&A experience would influence 
whether or not it advises IPO companies to adopt takeover defenses. 
2.  Law firm location and PE/VC backing. 
  Almost half (45%) of private equity-backed companies used a New York City law 
firm as legal counsel for their IPOs. On the other end of the spectrum, half (51%) of the 
venture capital-backed companies used a Silicon Valley law firm. PE-backed issuers’ 
legal counsel had represented 24.3 acquirers and 25.7 targets in M&A transactions on 
average, while VC-backed issuers’ legal counsel had only represented an average of 13.7 
acquirers and 21.6 targets. However, only the difference in acquirer representation is 
statistically significant. 
TABLE 5 
ESB Incidence by New York Law Firms & PE Backing 
    New York City law firm  
  No  Yes  Total 
No  77.1% 
(n=105) 
 
57.1% 
(n=14) 
74.8% 
(n=119) 
Yes  55.1% 
(n=69) 
 
45.8% 
(n=48) 
51.3% 
(n=117) 
 
 
 
 
Private equity 
backed 
Total  68.4% 
(n=174) 
48.4% 
(n=62) 
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Note:  Firms with dual class capital structures in which lower or no vote stock is sold (Dual Class 
Control=1) are excluded from this table. 
Table 5 shows that companies using a New York City law firm as legal counsel 
and companies backed by private equity funds are both less likely to have an effective 
staggered board than other companies. While issuers using a New York City law firm and 
private equity backed issuers had the lowest incidence of ESBs, the interaction effect of 
the variables is not statistically significant. 
Consistent  with  Coates,  Silicon  Valley  law  firms  are  no  longer  negatively 
correlated with classified boards. In fact, 87% of the 60 Silicon-Valley-law-firm-advised 
companies  have  effective  staggered  boards,  a  higher  percentage  than  the  other  firms 
(53%, p<.001). Initially, this appears to support the Silicon Valley Effect hypothesis and 
indicates that there is a positive correlation between takeover defenses and Silicon Valley 
law firms. As shown in Table 6, there is large overlap between Silicon Valley law firms 
and venture capital-backed firms (there is a 0.5 correlation) and the number of non–VC-
backed firms in the sample not using a Silicon Valley law firm (n=7) is extremely small. 
As a result, it is almost impossible to disentangle their collinear relationships with board 
classification in this table. 
Coates  found  that,  in  a  sample  of  IPOs  from  1991-92,  Silicon-Valley-lawyer-
advised firms had classified boards only 11% of the time, well below the sample average 
(34%,  p<.001),  but  by  1998–99,  Silicon-Valley-lawyer-advised  firms  had  classified 
boards  50%  of  the  time,  statistically  equivalent  to  other  firms  in  the 
sample.
†††††††††††††††††††††††††  Over the past 20 years, Silicon Valley lawyers’ clients were 
associated with a steadily increasing use of classified boards, topping out at nearly 92% 
in 2010, outpacing the general increase in classified board incidence in IPOs over that 
period. Given the criticism directed at such firms for not using classified boards in the 
earlier  period,  it  would  not  be  a  stretch  to  see  an  instance  of  over-correction  in  a 
movement from 11% to 50% to 92%. In any event, these results confirm there was likely 
never a client-based reason not to use classified boards in IPOs in the early 1990s, and 
that instead their scarcity in that period was due to inattention on the lawyers’ part in that 
period. 
                                                 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††  Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1377.   48 
 
TABLE 6 
ESB Incidence by Silicon Valley Law Firms and VC Backing 
    Silicon Valley law firm  
  No  Yes  Total 
No  41.9% 
(n=129) 
 
71.4% 
(n=7) 
43.4% 
(n=136) 
Yes  86.8% 
(n=53) 
93.6% 
(n=47) 
 
90% 
(n=100) 
 
 
 
 
Venture capital 
backed 
Total  54.9% 
(n=182) 
90.7% 
(n=54) 
 
 
Note:  Firms with dual class capital structures in which lower or no vote stock is sold (Dual Class 
Control=1) are excluded from this table. 
3.  Takeover defenses and PE/VC backing. 
Table 7 summarizes the incidence of numerous takeover defenses in the sample 
and in subsamples for venture capital and private equity backed companies. While only 
9% of companies in the complete sample had dual class stock and issued common stock 
with lower (or no) voting rights (DualClassControl=1), a full 12% of venture capital-
backed companies issued such stock. It is apparent that the central purpose of dual class 
stock issued by venture-backed companies was to preserve voting control. The opposite 
result is found in private equity-backed IPOs. While a higher portion (16%) of PE-backed 
companies had multiple classes of common stock, only 3% of PE-backed companies 
issued  low-/no-vote  stock.  Companies  backed  by  neither  private  equity  nor  venture 
capital are the most likely to issue such stock. This is probably because this category 
includes  family-run  companies  that  wish  to  preserve  control  in  the  family-owners  as 
Coates found in his 2001 study.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡   
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  See Coates,  Blame the Lawyers,  supra  note  †††††††††††††††,  at  1383.  In 
other words, the non-pecuniary private benefits of control are likely higher in family-run companies.   49 
 
TABLE 7 
Takeover Defense Frequency with VC & PE Subsamples 
As shown in Figure 4, the frequency of classified boards in venture capital-backed 
IPOs has doubled since the mid-1990s, where they were only present 43% of the time, to 
87%.  Likewise,  the  frequency  of  classified  boards  in  private  equity-backed  IPOs  has 
increased from 47% to 66%. However, this increase is not as nearly as dramatic as the 
increase  for  venture  capital-backed  IPOs  and  is  smaller  than  the  overall  increase  in 
classification over the same time period. The difference in mean classification for venture 
capital- and private equity-backed issuers is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
percentage of the 13 companies backed by both private equity and venture capital funds 
with  a  classified  board  is  an  astonishingly  high  93%.  The  incidence  of  board 
classification in companies not backed by either a venture capital or private equity firm 
has slightly increased from 41% in 1997 to 46% in the current sample. 
Type of takeover defense  Full sample 
VC  
subsample 
PE 
subsample 
t-statistic for 
difference 
subsample means 
Classified board  72%  87%  66%  3.59*** 
Effective Staggered Board (ESB)  60%  84%  47%  6.08*** 
E-Index  3.0  3.6  2.8  6.10*** 
Dual-class stock  16%  12%  16%  -0.78 
Dual-class stock with unequal voting 
rights 
9%  12%  3%  2.54** 
Implicit ban on poison pill  2.7%  2%  2%  0.08 
Anti-poison pill provision  1%  1%  0%  1.00 
Blank check preferred stock  98%  99%  98%  0.52 
Expanded constituency provision  1%  1%  2%  -0.52 
Fair price provision  0%  0%  1%  -1.00 
Board authorized to increase board size  99%  100%  99%  1.00 
Shareholders can act by written consent  24%  4%  46%  -7.98*** 
Shareholders can call a special meeting  23%  7%  33%  -4.89*** 
Supermajority requirement to amend 
bylaws 
65%  88%  53%  5.90*** 
Supermajority requirement to amend 
charter 
66%  89%  56%  5.69*** 
Supermajority requirement for mergers  2%  0%  3%  -1.75* 
N  259  99  107   
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 based on a two-tailed test.  
Note: Subsamples exclude companies that had both VC & PE backing.   50 
FIGURE 4 
Classified Board Incidence by VC and PE backing
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
 
As  noted  in  Part  IV.A.4,  venture  capital  and  private  equity  firms  back  a 
substantial number of IPOs in the sample. Effective staggered board incidence by venture 
and private equity backing is summarized in Table 8. Of issuers not subject to not subject 
to  low-vote  dual  class  structures,  90%  of  venture  capital-backed  companies  had  an 
effective staggered board. VC-backed firms are more likely to have effective classified 
boards,  whether  or  not  backed  by  PE-funds,  and  these  differences  are  statistically 
significant. Meanwhile, only 51% of private equity-backed companies had an ESB at 
their IPO. This is substantially lower than the incidence of ESBs at non-private equity-
backed companies (75%). Finally, companies that are not backed by private equity or 
venture capital funds have the lowest incidence of ESBs (31.3%).  
TABLE 8 
ESB Incidence by VC & PE Backing 
    Venture capital backed 
  No  Yes 
 
Total 
No  31.3% 
(n=32) 
 
  90.8% 
(n=87) 
 
74.8% 
(n=119) 
Yes  47.1% 
(n=104) 
 
84.6% 
(n=13) 
51.3% 
(n=117) 
 
 
 
 
Private equity 
backed 
Total  43.4% 
(n=136) 
 
90.0% 
(n=100) 
 
Note:  Firms with dual class capital structures in which lower or no vote stock is sold (Dual Class 
Control=1) are excluded from this table.  
                                                 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  1988-92 data is from Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1858. 1994-97 
data is from Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 96. 1998-99 data is from Coates, Blame the 
Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1376–77. Companies with a dual stock control structure are 
excluded from the 1999 and 2008-12 calculations. A missing column indicates that data was not available. 
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Table  7 a l s o   provides  a  breakdown  of  the  frequency  of  the  use  of  specific 
takeover  defenses  and  corporate  governance  provisions  at  private  equity  and  venture 
capital-backed companies. PE-backed issuers were much more likely than VC-backed 
issuers to include provisions that allow shareholders to act by written consent (46% of 
PE-backed  firms  allow  it  versus  only  4%  of  VC-backed  firms)  and  to  call  a  special 
meeting (33% PE versus 7% VC). The difference in both of these means is statistically 
significant.  (Meanwhile,  28%  of  companies  in  the  S&P  500  allow  action  by  written 
consent  and  53%  allow  shareholders  to  call  special  meetings.
************************** ) 
Shareholder action by written consent can actually help facilitate takeovers by permitting 
shareholders to accomplish the amendment of bylaws, removal of directors, filling of 
board  vacancies,  and  other  actions  that  can  otherwise  only  be  taken  at  a  meeting  of 
stockholders,
††††††††††††††††††††††††††  while  the  ability  to  call  a  special m eeting  similarly 
allows shareholders to take such actions without having to wait for the annual meeting. 
However, the motive of private equity firms that include such provisions in portfolio 
companies may be less innocuous than it seems. Instead, PE-backed companies likely 
allow action by written consent and special meetings in order to allow their private equity 
investors to take such actions. In fact, at least one law firm (Davis Polk) recommends that 
financial  sponsors  include  these  provisions  so  that  they  could  “maximize  [their] 
flexibility.”
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Nevertheless,  these  rights  may  still  be  valuable  to 
shareholders once financial sponsors sell their stakes.  
While the ability to act by written consent or call a special meeting can facilitate 
shareholders’  rights,  supermajority  provisions  inhibit  action  by  shareholders.  An 
extremely large proportion (88%) of venture capital-backed companies has supermajority 
requirements to amend the corporate charter or bylaws and slightly more than half of PE-
backed  companies  have  such  provisions.  In  comparison,  only  44%  of  S&P  500 
companies have a supermajority requirement to amend the charter and only 31% require 
a supermajority to amend bylaws.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  These requirements often work to 
the detriment of shareholders and essentially give financial sponsors veto rights over 
charter and bylaw amendments. 
                                                 
**************************  Based  upon  the  number  of  eligible  and  active  S&P  500  companies  in  the 
SharkRepellent.net database as of Feb. 28, 2013. 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††  See  DEL. CODE. ANN. t i t .  8 ,  § 2 2 8 ;  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §  7 . 0 4 ;  E t h a n  
Klingsberg,  Action by Written Consent: A New Focus for Shareholder Activism,  HARV.  LAW SCHOOL 
FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG., July 5, 2010, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/05/action-
by-written-consent-a-new-focus-for-shareholder-activism/. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Davis  Polk  &  Wardwell,  Post-IPO  Charter  Provisions  for  Portfolio 
Companies ( P r i v a t e  E q u i t y  N e w s l e t t e r ,  F e b .  2 0 0 6 ) ,   available  at 
http://www.davispolk.com/1485409/dpw/02_16_06_PrivateEquityNews_feb_06.pdf. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Based  upon  the  number  of  eligible  and  active  S&P  500  companies  in  the 
SharkRepellent.net database as of Feb. 28, 2013.   52 
The incidence of anti-takeover provisions such as unequal voting rights, classified 
boards,  limitations  on  shareholder  action  by  written  consent  or  special  meeting,  and 
supermajority requirements in companies backed by venture capital and private equity 
firms is generally consistent with the PE/VC Private Benefits hypothesis. While private 
equity-backed companies, on average, do not have as strong takeover defenses as venture 
capital-backed companies, they still have a higher incidence of defenses as compared to 
public companies. The one exception observed is that private equity-backed companies 
are more likely to allow action by written consent and special meetings than VC-backed 
and S&P 500 companies. However, this anomaly may be explained by the desire of 
private equity firms to maintain maximum flexibility while they still have high ownership 
stakes. 
4.  PE/VC backing and issuer characteristics. 
Table 9 illustrates the different characteristics of companies and their IPOs of 
issuers backed by venture capital firms and issuers backed by private equity firms. Fifty-
three percent (53%) of VC-backed issuers have their headquarters in California while 
only 9% of PE-backed companies were based in California. On the other hand, more PE-
backed companies (15%) were based out of Texas (15%) than VC-backed companies 
(6%). 
Unsurprising given the popular perception of the venture capital industry, 72% of 
VC-backed companies were in high tech industries. This is in stark contrast to the 21% of 
PE-backed  companies  in  high  tech  industries.  VC-backed  companies  also  are  in 
industries with a mean of 62.5 M&A transactions in the three years prior to the IPO 
(versus  a  mean  of  17.6  for  PE-backed  companies).  This  number,  however,  is  likely 
skewed by the number of VC-backed companies in the software industry (42%), which, 
as mentioned in Part IV.A.1, had the highest level of M&A activity.  
Issuers sponsored by private equity firms had an average of almost $2 billion 
more in assets at the time of the IPO. Nevertheless, there is no statistically significant 
difference in the pre-IPO market capitalization of VC- and PE-backed companies. While, 
on average, a larger percentage of the IPO was offered by the primary issuer in VC-
backed IPOs (85%) than in PE-backed IPOs (71%), PE backed companies had a higher 
average IPO float (33% versus 27.5%). 
The average PE-backed company was more than twice as old (20 years) than the 
average VC-backed company (9 years) at the IPO. As 66% of PE-backed IPOs were 
actually RLBOs, one would expect PE-backed companies to be older. While 43% of both 
VC-  and  PE-backed  companies  had  a  CEO-Chairman,  more  than  half  (54%)  of  VC-
backed companies had a founding CEO (whereas only 22% of PE-backed companies had   53 
a CEO founder). This may, in part, also be due to the difference in the mean age of PE- 
and VC-backed companies. 
TABLE 9 
Summary Statistics for VC and PE-backed Issuer Subsamples 
  VC 
Mean or 
percentage 
PE 
Mean or 
percentage 
Difference in 
means 
t-statistic for 
difference in 
means 
Panel A: Company Headquarters  
California  53%  9%  43%  7.47*** 
Massachusetts  8%  5%  3%  0.99 
New York  3%  3%  0%  0.10 
Texas  6%  15%  -9%  -2.11** 
         
Panel B: Company Industry 
High Tech  72%  21%  51%  8.51*** 
Software  42%  8%  34%  5.99*** 
Medical  4%  2%  2%  0.91 
M&A in Industry  62.5  17.6  44.9  7.90*** 
         
Panel C: Company Size and IPO 
Assets ($M before offering)  212.9  2124.8  -1911.8  -4.15*** 
Market Cap ($M)  1611.9  1143.4  468.5  0.55 
IPO Float  27.5%  33%  -5.6%  -2.21** 
% shares offered by issuer  85%  71%  14%  3.70*** 
NYSE Listed  26%  63%  -36%  -5.62*** 
Reverse LBO  9%  66%  57%  -10.54*** 
         
Panel D: Other Company Information 
Company Age (years)  9.1  20.1  -11.8  -5.26*** 
Delaware Incorporated  98%  94%  4%  1.35 
         
Panel E: Company Management  
CEO is chairman  43%  43%  0%  0.06 
CEO is founder  54%  22%  31%  4.81*** 
CEO’s age  48.8  53.1  -4.5  -4.16*** 
Insider Ownership  54.3%  46.4%  7.9%  1.85* 
         
Panel F: Issuer Law Firm         
New York City law firm  7%  45%  -38%  -6.89*** 
Silicon Valley law firm  51%  6%  45%  8.13*** 
Law firm acquirer rep. (#)   13.7  24.3  -10.6  -3.99*** 
Law firm target rep. (#)  21.6  25.7  -4.1  -1.34 
# of IPOs rep’d in sample  10.4  6.08  4.3  4.72*** 
Law firm size (# lawyers)  877.7  1103.8  -226.1  -2.25** 
N  99  107     
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 based on a two-tailed test.  
Note: Excludes companies with both VC & PE backing. 
5.  Management characteristics.   54 
Table 10 displays the percentage of IPO companies with an effective staggered 
board broken down by CEO characteristics in companies without a dual class control 
structure. When companies are grouped together based on whether their CEO’s age was 
above or below the mean CEO age, firms with CEOs 51 years old and younger have a 
much higher incidence (72%) of effective classification than firms with CEOs that are 52 
years and older (53%). This result is statistically significant at the 5% level. Companies 
with a founding CEO also had a higher incidence of ESBs (70%) than other companies 
(60%). However, this result is only significant at the 10% level. ESB incidence for the 
CEO-Chairman variable is not statistically significant. The CEO-Founder and CEO-Age 
results  are  consistent  with  the  Management  Entrenchment  hypothesis.  While  not 
statistically significant, the result indicating that companies with a CEO-Chairman are 
less likely to have a classified board than a company that separates those roles is actually 
the opposite of what the Management Entrenchment hypothesis predicts. 
TABLE 10 
ESB Incidence by CEO Characteristics 
 
Value  % with ESB  n  t-test 
Yes  60.6%  104 
CEO is chairman? 
No  64.7%  133 
0.64 
Yes  70.0%  80 
CEO is founder? 
No  59.6%  156 
-1.6* 
<51.4 years  72.1%  122 
CEO age? 
>51.4 years  53.0%  115 
3.1** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (statistical significance for difference in mean ESB). Firms 
with dual class capital structures in which lower or no vote stock is sold (DualClassControl =1) 
are excluded from this table 
6.  Issuer size and takeover defenses: The “ISS Effect.” 
Figure 5 shows that the incidence of board classification in the IPO sample is 
significantly higher than frequency of board classification in already-public companies. 
In fact, a company undergoing an IPO is almost twice as more likely to have a classified 
board than a company in the Russell 2000 index. However, this does not account for the 
size of the company. Figure 6 illustrates board classification in the IPO sample by market 
cap decile, matched against comparably sized public companies.
***************************  Even 
when controlling for size, it is clear that the rate of classification in IPOs is higher than it 
                                                 
***************************  Data for public companies is from the SharkRepellent.net database. The first 
nine deciles represent companies in the Russell 2000 index, while the largest decile includes S&P 500 
companies.   55 
is in public companies. Therefore, the high incidence of takeover defenses in IPOs cannot 
be simply explained away by pointing to the size of the companies.  
FIGURE 5 
Classified Board Incidence in IPOs and Stock Indices
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††  
 
FIGURE 6 
Classified Board Incidence in IPOs Matched to Comparably Sized Public Companies 
 
                                                 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††  For the indexes, percentages are based upon the number of eligible and active 
companies in the SharkRepellent.net database as of Feb. 28, 2013. 
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Figure 6 also illustrates that there is a significant drop-off in classified board 
incidence for the companies with the largest market caps in the sample (those valued at 
over  $2.3  billion).  This  is  consistent  with  anticipated  pressure  from  institutional 
shareholders as there is a high correlation (r = 0.73) between market capitalization and 
the number of institutional investors. I call this the “ISS effect,” a finding consistent with 
our interviews
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  and the continued drop in classified boards among the 
very largest (S&P 500 and Fortune 500) mature public companies. As discussed above in 
Part  II.A.2  these  companies—which  typically  receive  the  most  publicity—have  been 
frequent targets of shareholder activists and have faced the most pressure and significant 
numbers of shareholder proposals to declassify. 
7.  Summary of mean comparisons & univariate regressions. 
The prevalence of takeover defenses—specifically, effective classified boards—at 
IPO companies is much greater than the incidence of such defenses at mature public 
companies. The identity of an issuer’s legal counsel appears to affect the number of and 
choice of takeover defenses, as well as their effectiveness, consistent with what the law 
firm hypotheses suggest. The location of legal counsel also appears to have a relationship 
with takeover defenses. However, given high correlations between law firm location and 
financial sponsor type, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusion on this point from 
a univariate regression.  
Venture capital backing appears to have a tremendously strong correlation with 
takeover defenses. While private equity backing seems to be associated with the presence 
of  some  takeover-facilitating  provisions,  it  is  unclear  what  the  overall  relationship  is 
between  PE-backing  and  takeover  defenses.  The  high  prevalence  of  anti-takeover 
provisions in VC-backed companies is consistent with the Private Benefits hypothesis 
and  is  the  opposite  of  what  the  Institutional  Investor  Efficiency  and  Substitute 
Governance hypotheses predict. 
Finally,  there  is  some  evidence  marginally  consistent  with  the  Management 
Entrenchment  hypothesis  as  takeover  defenses  are  more  likely  to  be  found  in  IPO 
companies  with  a  founding  CEO  and  in  those  with  younger  CEOs.  However,  as  the 
coefficient  for  a  CEO-Chairman  is  not  statistically  significant,  there  is  not  enough 
evidence  from  univariate  regressions  to  draw  any  concrete  conclusions  regarding  the 
hypothesis. 
8.  Charter provisions in private equity backed issuers. 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Interviews with 3 New York-based law firm partners.   57 
A small number of private equity-backed companies went public with unusual 
charter  provisions  that  are  worth  examining.  Appendix  A  details  a  sample  of  such 
provisions. Two companies went public with charter provisions in which a requirement 
that directors may only be removed for cause through a supermajority of the shareholder 
vote  would  be  triggered  as  soon  as  the  private  equity  sponsors  ceased  to  own  a 
controlling  stake  in  the  company.  Such  provisions  appear  to  have  the  effect  of 
maintaining private equity firms’ flexibility while they still hold a meaningful share of 
the company. These provisions, however, then essentially give the private equity funds 
veto  power  over  the  removal  of  directors  even  after  share  ownership  becomes  more 
dispersed. And even after the private equity firm sells all of its shares of the company, the 
public shareholders are stuck with these onerous provisions that allow for an effective 
staggered board. One IPO issuer (Graham Packaging Company) had a similar charter 
provision in which a requirement that directors may only be removed for cause through a 
supermajority vote only applied when the private equity sponsor (Blackstone) owned 
between 10% and 50% of the stock. This provision also essentially gives the private 
equity sponsor veto power even as it sells down its stake. However, it does not leave 
public shareholders out in the cold once the private equity firm exits the company as it 
ceases to apply once their ownership falls below 10%. Finally, in one instance a charter 
contained a provision that would automatically classify the board into three classes after 
the company’s private equity owners cease to own a majority of the company’s shares 
The presence of these charter provisions lends support to the theory that private 
equity and venture capital firms install takeover defenses in charter companies in order to 
extract private benefits of control. They effectively give private equity funds veto rights 
in  any  battle  to  remove  or  replace  the  companies’  boards  while  the  funds  still  own 
sizeable stakes. The variation in the drafting of these provisions also evidences an agency 
problem between lawyers and a company’s other shareholders. It is obvious that all of 
these provisions were drafted for the benefit of the private equity funds. However, only 
one law firm—Simpson Thacher, which represented 25% more acquirers than targets in 
public M&A transactions—appears to have balanced the private equity funds’ desire for 
anti-takeover provisions with the desires of other pre-IPO shareholders (by providing for 
at-will removal by a simple majority of the vote once the private equity firm owns less 
than 10%). 
9.  Mutual funds and pension funds as pre-IPO shareholders. 
A  mutual  fund  or  public  pension  fund  was  one  of  the  top  three  pre-IPO 
shareholders for nine companies in the sample. Fidelity, Vanguard, Alberta Investment 
Management  Corp  (“AIMCo”),  and  the  Ontario  Teachers’  Pension  Plan  (“Ontario 
Teachers”) held pre-IPO stakes ranging from 7% to 49%. As discussed in Part II.A.2, 
pension  funds  and  mutual  funds  have  been  the  institutional  investors  that  have  most   58 
vigorously opposed takeover defenses such as classified boards in public companies. All 
of  these  mutual  and  pension  funds  have  adopted  public  policies  supporting  annual 
elections and opposing effective staggered boards (available in Appendix B). In fact, 
Ontario  Teachers’  explicitly  states  that  classified  boards  may  result  in  “permanent 
impairment of long-term shareholder value.”
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
Against all expectations, seven out of the nine companies in this sub-sample went 
public with an effective staggered board. And one of the two firms without an ESB had 
an effective dual class control capital structure instead. These results are both unexpected 
and  revealing.  Mutual  funds  appear  to  be  hypocrites  when  it  comes  to  matters  of 
corporate governance in pre-IPO portfolio companies. Although the SEC requires mutual 
funds to disclose their proxy voting policies and procedures,
****************************  it does 
not require funds to disclose whether they actually complied with those internal policies 
and guidelines in situations other than formal proxy votes. This lack of transparency 
decreases the pressure that mutual funds face to institute or push for optimal governance 
arrangements at pre-IPO portfolio companies. One possible objection to drawing such a 
conclusion may be that mutual funds do not have controlling positions in these issuers 
and  therefore  are  not  in  control  of  the  governance  arrangements  that  they  adopt. 
However, in four out of the nine examples in the sub-sample, the mutual fund had at least 
a 25% stake, and Ontario Teachers’ had an almost 50% stake in GNC Holdings. It is 
difficult to believe that influential investors holding significant stakes have no influence 
over issuers’ choice of governance arrangements.
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††  
TABLE 11 
Takeover Defenses in Mutual and Pension Fund Backed IPOs 
Pre-IPO Holder  Pre-IPO stake  Issuer  Issuer had ESB or 
DualClassControl? 
Fidelity (Ventures)  41.9%  Exa Corp.  Yes 
Fidelity  10.9%  Fluidigm Corp.  Yes 
Fidelity  10.0%  GenMark Diagnostics  Yes 
Fidelity  11.1%  KYTHERA Biopharmaceuticals  Yes 
Fidelity  7.0%  Merrimack Pharmaceuticals  No 
                                                 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See supra text accompanying note ‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡. 
****************************  The  SEC  requires  mutual  funds  to  disclose  their  proxy  voting  policies, 
procedures, and records. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17 CFR pts. 239, 
249, 279 & 274 (2013)). The SEC believed that disclosure would “illuminate potential conflicts of interest 
and discourage voting that is inconsistent with fund shareholders’ best interests” and that increasing the 
transparency of proxy voting by funds would lead funds to become more engaged in corporate governance 
issues. Id. at 6566.   
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††  “The increased equity holdings and accompanying voting power of mutual 
funds  place  them  in  a  position  to  have  enormous  influence  on  corporate  accountability.  As  major 
shareholders, mutual funds may play a vital role in monitoring the stewardship of the companies in which 
they invest.” Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies, supra note ***************************, at 6565.   59 
Vanguard  10.7%  Vocera Communications   Yes 
AIMCo  26.1%  Bonanza Creek Energy  Yes 
AIMCo  26.3%  KiOR   Yes 
Ontario Teachers’  48.9%  GNC Holdings  Yes 
 
Another plausible explanation for this hypocrisy may result from the separation of 
investing  and  voting  functions  in  some  mutual  funds.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Some 
investment  managers  rely  on  designated  non-portfolio  management  personnel—
sometimes  referred  to  as  internal  “corporate  governance”  staff—to  vote  portfolio 
companies’ shares, while other funds simply rely on third-party proxy advisory services 
such as ISS.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  It is possible that a fund’s internal corporate governance 
staff is not involved in—and is possibly unaware of—the corporate governance of pre-
IPO portfolio companies, and it is almost certain that proxy advisory services are not 
involved.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  investing  personnel  who  are  not  knowledgeable  in 
corporate  governance  issues  may  be  responsible  for  the  observed  sub-sample  results. 
Nevertheless, mutual funds and their advisors still have fiduciary responsibilities that 
require  them  to  oversee  these  functions.
*****************************  Another  possible  excuse 
may be that mutual funds and public pension funds are passive investors. However, they 
have long ago admitted that being passive and pushing for good corporate governance are 
not  mutually  exclusive.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  voicing  their  views  on  corporate 
governance before an IPO is taking an activist approach while voicing those views after 
an IPO is consistent with passivity.   
The  fact  that  these  mutual  and  public  pension  funds  appear  to  care  about 
corporate governance only when their efforts are easily observable draws into doubt their 
credibility and public stances on what constitutes “good governance.” It may lead one to 
question whether such funds actually believe in their governance policy positions or if 
they instead simply adopt whatever position looks best on paper. Can we genuinely rely 
on them as ‘stewards’ of proper corporate governance when they fail to follow their 
principles at the time they have the most influence? 
C.  Multivariate Regressions and Analysis 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  See Charles Nathan & Parul Mehta, The Parallel Universes of Institutional 
Investing and Institutional Voting, HARV. LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG., April 6, 2010, 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/04/06/the-parallel-universes-of-institutional-investing-and-
institutional-voting/ (alleging that that this separation is the “prevailing paradigm”). 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, OVERSIGHT OF FUND PROXY VOTING 
4 (2008), http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_08_proxy_voting.pdf. 
*****************************  Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 
180, 191 (1963) (holding that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 recognizes a fiduciary relationship); 
INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note §§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§, at 1 (noting that boards 
remain responsible for oversight proxy voting functions even if the board delegates it to another party).   60 
  Three sets of regressions are presented in order to explore the determinants of 
takeover defenses using the hypotheses first described in Part II. In all of the regressions, 
a spline function is used to control for the relationship between firm market capitalization 
and  board  classification.  A  two-segment  (piecewise)  spline  function  is  a  statistical 
method that can account for a structural change, or threshold, in the relationship between 
two  variables.
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††  The  significant  drop-off  in  classification  for  the 
largest companies—referred to as the “ISS Effect” and illustrated earlier in Figure 6—is a 
structural change that indicates the need for a spline function.  
The takeover defenses of most interest are effective staggered boards (ESB) and 
dual class structures with a controlling class. While the E-Index is also a useful measure, 
it is simply a more noisy measure. Nonetheless, I still report some models using the E-
Index for illustrative purposes and to allow for comparisons to studies relying on that 
variable.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  Companies with multiple classes of common shares that 
are  selling  low-  or  no-vote  stock  in  their  IPOs  (DualClassControl=1)  are  analyzed 
separately and excluded from other models because the presence of such structures render 
board classification irrelevant 
1.  Law firm models. 
Table 12 presents multivariate regressions in order to examine whether the data 
supports  the  Law  Firm  Role  or  Law  Firm  M&A  hypotheses,  along  with  the  Silicon 
Valley Effect hypothesis. Models (1), (3), and (4) present logistic regressions in which 
the  dependent  variable  is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  an  issuer  has  an  effective 
staggered board (ESB). Model (2) presents an ordered logistic regression in which the 
issuer’s E-Index is the dependent variable. All of the models report the expected odds 
ratio.  An  odds  ratio  greater  than  1.0  (“positive”)  implies  that  an  increase  in  the 
explanatory variable is associated with an increase in the probability that an issuer has 
takeover defenses while an odds ratio less than 1.0 (“negative”) implies that an increase 
in the explanatory variable is expected to be associated with a decrease in the probability. 
In Model (1), the odds ratio for the number of M&A transactions for which an 
issuer’s counsel represented targets (Law Target Deals) is positive and highly significant 
(p<0.006) and the odds ratio for the number of acquirer-side M&A transactions (Law 
Acquirer Deals) is negative and significant (p<0.027). A change of Law Target Deals 
from the 25th percentile (7 transactions) to the 75th percentile (31) is expected to increase 
the probability of having an ESB by 27.3% while a change of Law Acquirer Deals from 
                                                 
†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††  See  WILLIAM  H.  GREENE,  ECONOMETRIC  ANALYSIS 1 5 8  ( 7 t h  e d .  2 0 1 2 )  
(describing spline function); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment's 
Differing Impacts Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203, 254 (2005) (using spline function in a model). 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  As ESB and E-Index are strongly correlated (r = 0.7), I did not expect the 
reported exponentiated coefficients to be materially different.   61 
the 25th percentile (4) to the 75th percentile (26) is expected to decrease the probability 
by 21.4%.
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  Model (2) confirms that these results hold when E-Index 
is the dependent variable in an ordered logit regression. Both models are consistent with 
the Law Firm Role hypothesis, which predicts a statistically significant odds ratio greater 
than 1 for Law Target Deals and less than 1 for Law Acquirer Deals. The more M&A 
targets that a law firm represents, the higher the probability that an issuer using that law 
firm adopts an ESB. The results also lead me to reject the Law Firm M&A hypothesis, 
which predicted that both of these odds ratios would be positive and significant.  
Model  (3)  uses  an  alternative  specification  for  the  law  firm  hypotheses.  The 
expected odds ratio for the Law More Target Deals, a dummy variable set to 1 if issuer’s 
counsel represented more targets than acquirers in M&A transactions, is strongly positive 
and significant (p<0.013). It indicates that the odds that an issuer goes public with an 
ESB are more than twice as high for issuers using a law firm that represents more M&A 
targets than acquirers than those using other law firms.. Meanwhile, the odds ratio for 
Law Total Deals is not statistically significant (p<0.343), indicating that overall M&A 
experience  is  not  associated  with  a  change  in  the  probability  of  an  ESB.
* Therefore, 
Model (3) is also consistent with the Law Firm Role hypothesis and inconsistent with the 
Law Firm M&A hypothesis.  
Model (4) is used to test the Silicon Valley Effect hypothesis. The odds ratio of 
the Silicon Valley Law indicator coefficient is positive and somewhat significant. The 
model indicates that issuers using a Silicon Valley lawyer as legal counsel are more than 
twice as likely to use an effective staggered board than other issuers, consistent with the 
hypothesized  Silicon  Valley  Effect.  However,  as  discussed  in  Part  IV.B.2,  there  is  a 
linear relationship between Silicon Valley Law and Venture Capital that makes it difficult 
to discern exactly which of the two variables is responsible for the results in this model. 
Law Target Deals remains statistically significant and positive in this model (p<0.041) 
and Law Acquirer Deals is still less than 1.0. The standard errors of both variables are 
higher in this model, indicating possible multicollinearity between these variables and 
Silicon Valley Law. Nevertheless, the results are also consistent with the Law Firm Role 
hypothesis. 
                                                 
§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§§  In these predictions, all other variables in the model are held at their mean. 
* In an unreported regression, I added an interaction of Law More Target Deals and Law Total 
Deals to the alternative specification of Model (2). In that regression, the signs and significance of the 
explanatory  variables  did  not  change  and  the  interaction  variable’s  coefficient  was  not  statistically 
significant.   62 
 
TABLE 12 
Law Firm Hypotheses 
Models 1 and 2 are logistic regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if the issuer had an effective 
staggered board (ESB) when it went public. Model 3 is an ordered logistic regression in which the dependent variable 
equals the E-Index, ranging from 0 to 5, for the issuer when it went public. The sample consists of 236 initial public 
offerings issued between 2008 and 2012 for which there was no controlling dual class capital structure. The p-values 
are reported in parentheses. Law Target (Acquirer) Deals is the number of public M&A transactions for which an 
issuer’s legal counsel represented the target (acquirer) in the 3 years prior to the IPO. Silicon Valley Law is a dummy 
set to one if legal counsel is from the Silicon Valley. Law More Target is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer’s 
legal counsel represented more targets than acquirers in public M&A transactions. Law Total Deals is the total number 
of M&A transactions for which an issuer’s legal counsel represented the target or the acquirer. Industry M&A is the 
number of public M&A transactions that occurred in an issuer’s 3-digit SIC industry in the 3 years prior to the IPO. 
Delaware is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is incorporated in Delaware. IPO Float is the percentage of 
shares offered in an IPO. Company Age is the age of the issuer at its IPO. Market Cap is the market cap ($M) of the 
issuer up to the 90
th percentile before the IPO. Large Market Cap is the market cap ($M) of issuers in the 90
th percentile 
(the largest companies). 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  ESB  E-Index  ESB  ESB 
         
Law Target Deals  1.048
*** 
(0.006) 
1.045
*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
1.037
** 
(0.041) 
         
Law Acquirer Deals  0.958
** 
(0.027) 
0.958
*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.968 
(0.111) 
         
Law More Target   
 
 
 
2.337
** 
(0.013) 
 
 
         
Law Total Deals   
 
 
 
1.004 
(0.343) 
 
 
         
Silicon Valley Law   
 
 
 
 
 
2.787
* 
(0.061) 
         
Industry M&A  1.014
*** 
(0.002) 
1.014
*** 
(0.000) 
1.016
*** 
(0.001) 
1.013
*** 
(0.003) 
         
Delaware  5.542
*** 
(0.007) 
2.709
** 
(0.045) 
5.179
*** 
(0.009) 
4.626
** 
(0.016) 
         
IPO Float  0.961
*** 
(0.000) 
0.972
*** 
(0.000) 
0.963
*** 
(0.001) 
0.966
*** 
(0.002) 
         
Company Age  1.013 
(0.130) 
1.003 
(0.675) 
1.013 
(0.125) 
1.013 
(0.113) 
         
Market Cap  1.040 
(0.195) 
1.048
** 
(0.040) 
1.049 
(0.123) 
1.036 
(0.232) 
         
Large Market Cap  0.999
*** 
(0.000) 
1.000
** 
(0.017) 
0.999
*** 
(0.000) 
0.999
*** 
(0.001) 
         
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Chi-squared  77.697
***  71.719
***  77.100
***  81.655
***   63 
Pseudo R
2  0.249  0.117  0.247  0.262 
Reporting odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients); 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
All  models  also  include  a  set  of  control  variables.  Consistent  with  Daines  & 
Klausner
† and Coates,
‡ a higher level of M&A activity (Industry M&A) in an issuer’s 
industry is associated with a higher probability that an issuer goes public with takeover 
defenses  in  all  models.  Delaware  incorporation  (Delaware)  is  strongly  positive  and 
significant,  implying  that  Delaware-incorporated  companies  are  over  five  times  more 
likely  to  have  an  ESB  than  companies  incorporated  elsewhere.  This  result  is  also 
consistent with Coates.
§ The odds ratio for IPO Float is negative and highly significant in 
all models, indicating that there is a lower probability that IPOs offering the most shares 
(as a percentage of total shares) will have an ESB. Company age was not significant in 
any model. Large Market Cap, a variable representing the size of the largest issuers, is 
negative  and  highly  significant  (p<0.001),  consistent  with  the  prediction  of  an  “ISS 
Effect.” The goodness-of-fit measure (pseudo R-squared) for the ESB models is around 
0.25, suggesting that the model is properly identified.
** Additionally, there is no reason to 
expect that the law firm M&A variables introduce any endogeneity issues. Recall that 
Coates found that there were no testable differences in the clientele of law firms.
†† Issuers 
choose their law firms far in advance of their decisions to go public based and do not 
base their choice of law firms on the firms’ beliefs about takeover defenses such as an 
ESB.
‡‡ Additionally, law firm switching costs for issuers are particularly high.
§§  
These  results  reveal  that  legal  advice  appears  to  have  a  significant  impact  on 
whether  an  issuer  chooses  to  adopt  takeover  defenses  and  that  this  legal  advice  is 
influenced by the side of the table that a law firm sits in M&A transactions. As discussed 
in Part IV.B.1, the identity of an issuer’s legal counsel also appears to affect whether or 
not  the  adopted  takeover  defenses  are  actually  effective.  In  his  study  of  IPOs  in  the 
1990s, Coates noted, “One can say with high confidence that lawyers with more M&A 
proficiency are more knowledgeable about, pay more attention to, and are more likely to 
advise clients to adopt defenses.”
*** My results directly contradict Coates’s findings with 
respect to IPOs between 2008 and 2012, as overall M&A proficiency has no correlation 
with  the  adoption  of  takeover  defenses  in  the  sample.  Coates,  however,  had  no 
                                                 
† Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1370; Daines & Klausner, supra 
note ††††††††††, at 102. 
‡ Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1366.  
§ Id. a t  1 3 6 6  ( r e p o r t i n g  h i g h e r  i n c i d e n c e  o f  t a k e o v e r  d e f e n s e s  a t  D e l a w a r e -incorporated 
companies). 
** For an overview of goodness-of-fit measures for logistic models, see JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 465 (2010). 
†† Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1378. 
‡‡ Id. at 1314. 
§§ See id. at 1316–17; Ronald Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: a Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 900 (1990). 
*** Coates, Blame the Lawyers, supra note †††††††††††††††, at 1378.   64 
expectation that his conclusions would persist. He recognized that defenses had become 
more common and uniform—and that the relationship between overall M&A proficiency 
and defense adoption weakened—throughout the 1990s as learning occurred,
 ††† and he 
correctly  hypothesized  that  the  legal  industry  would  transform  as  firms  diversify.
‡‡‡ 
Simultaneously, M&A law firms’ expertise on takeover defenses has diffused to non-
M&A firms, which now recognize the importance of the issue.
§§§ We can also generally 
reject Bebchuk’s explanation based on law firm self-interest. There is no reason to expect 
that lawyers’ incentives to avoid reputational harm caused by the takeover of a client 
would be relevant only for law firms that predominantly represent M&A targets, or that 
law firms that represent acquirers would be more likely to act against their self-interest. 
While Bebchuk’s hypothesis fails to explain the variation in defense adoption within the 
sample, it nevertheless may still help explain why overall adoption has increased since 
the 1990s. 
We can also reject the idea that defenses are generally optimal for pre-IPO owner-
managers  today.  Coates  concluded  that  the  correlation  between  law  firms’  M&A 
proficiency and IPO takeover defenses indicated that law firms recognized that defenses 
were generally optimal at the time.
**** Although defenses may have been optimal in the 
mid  1990s,  that  theory  no  longer  holds  today  because  overall  M&A  knowledge  and 
experience are no longer correlated to the adoption of defenses. The lack of a consensus 
amongst the most knowledgeable law firms prevents us from looking to them for an 
efficiency-based explanation. One possible explanation for these new results may lie in 
the  changes  in  executive  compensation  over  the  past  two  decades.  Executive 
compensation from selling the company is much higher now than it was in the 1990s.
†††† 
The “golden parachute” payments that executives can receive in a takeover may decrease 
the value of trying to preserve private benefits through the use of takeover defenses. 
As  takeover  defense  adoption  is  correlated  with  law  firms’  roles,  one  can 
reasonably conclude that legal advice on defenses is influenced by anecdotal evidence 
within a law firm rather than empirical data or a systemic evaluation of the relevant 
evidence.  Law  firms  that  predominantly  represent  targets  may  believe  that  takeover 
defenses are valuable to shareholders while law firms that represent more acquirers may 
believe  that  defenses  impede  value-creating  takeovers  and  hurt  shareholders.  An 
                                                 
††† See id. at 1378. 
‡‡‡ See id. at 1384.  
§§§ For example, 100% of the issuer’s advised by Gunderson Dettmer went public with an ESB, 
even though Gunderson Dettmer only had experience with 1 M&A transaction. In the early 1990s, issuers 
advised by such a firm almost never went public with such a defense. 
**** See id. at 1383. 
†††† See Paul Hodgson & Greg Ruel, Twenty-One U.S. CEOs with Golden Parachutes of More than 
$100  Million ( G M I  R a t i n g s ,  J a n .  2012),  available  at 
http://origin.library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1102561686275-
69/GMI_GoldenParachutes_012012.pdf.   65 
alternative explanation rooted in Bebchuk’s hypothesis is that the pain of losing a client is 
more  salient  to  target  law  firms,  causing  them  to  prefer  defenses.  However,  this 
hypothesis does not explain why acquirer-side M&A experience would have a negative 
correlation with the inclusion of takeover defenses or why overall M&A experience has 
no correlation. 
2.  Private equity & venture capital models. 
The multivariate regressions used to assess the private equity and venture capital 
hypotheses are presented in Table 13. Model (1) presents a logistic regression in which 
the  dependent  variable  is  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  an  issuer  has  an  effective 
staggered board (ESB) while Model (2) presents an ordered logistic regression in which 
the issuer’s E-Index is the dependent variable.  
In Models (1) and (2), the odds ratio for Venture Capital Backing is extremely 
strong  and  significant  (p<0.001).  Venture  capital  backed  companies  were  over  seven 
times more likely to go public with an ESB. This result persists even after controlling for 
the  level  of  M&A  in  the  issuer’s  industry,  the  issuer’s  size,  and  other  explanatory 
variables.  On  the  other  hand,  Private  Equity  Backing  does  not  appear  to  have  a 
statistically significant effect on the adoption of takeover defenses such as an ESB. With 
respect  to  Venture  Capital  Backing,  the  results  are  consistent  with  the  VC  Private 
Benefits hypothesis and inconsistent with the VC Institutional Investor Efficiency and 
Substitute  Governance  hypotheses.  On  the  other  hand,  the  results  for  Private Equity 
Backing fail to substantiate both the PE Private Benefits and PE Institutional Investor 
Efficiency hypotheses.  
The  robust,  statistically  significant  effect  of  venture  capital  backing  on  the 
prevalence IPO takeover defenses is a novel and noteworthy development. Recall that 
Daines and Klausner found that the coefficients on the indicator variables for VC– and 
PE–backing  were  insignificant.
‡‡‡‡ Baker  and  Gompers  posited  that  the  insignificant 
result was due to the fact that venture capital and private equity firm ownership may 
substitute  for  the  external  market  for  corporate  control  by  instituting  better  internal 
governance  mechanisms.  With  respect  to  venture–backed  firms,  this  explanation  is 
inconsistent with my results. As discussed in Part II.C.4, venture capital firms lose their 
incentive to exercise their voice once a portfolio company is taken public in an IPO, and 
they seek to exit their investments after the expiration of IPO lock-ups. Additionally, they 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡ Daines & Klausner, supra note ††††††††††, at 95. Similarly, Field & Karpoff found that the 
coefficient for venture backing was insignificant. See Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1870.   66 
give up most of their control rights at the IPO
§§§§ and thus can no longer serve effective 
substitutes for the external market for corporate control.  
 
TABLE 13 
Private Equity & Venture Capital Hypotheses 
Models 1 and 3 are logistic regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if the issuer had an effective 
staggered board (ESB) when it went public. Model 2 is an ordered logistic regression in which the dependent variable 
equals the E-Index, ranging from 0 to 5, for the issuer when it went public. Model (4) is a bivariate probit regression, 
where  the  first  stage  (unreported)  includes  Venture Capital a s  the  instrumental  (dependent)  variable  and  TXHQ, 
MAHQ, NYHQ, NJHQ, CAHQ, and HIGHTECH as the independent variables. The sample consists of 235 initial 
public offerings issued between 2008 and 2012 for which there was no controlling dual class capital structure. The p-
values are reported in parentheses. Private Equity (Venture Capital) Backing is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
private equity (venture capital) fund is one of the 3 largest pre-IPO shareholders of an issuer. Industry M&A is the 
number of public M&A transactions that occurred in an issuer’s 3-digit SIC industry in the 3 years prior to the IPO. 
Delaware is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is incorporated in Delaware. IPO Float is the percentage of 
shares offered in an IPO. Company Age is the age of the issuer at its IPO. Market Cap is the market cap ($M) of the 
issuer up to the 90
th percentile before the IPO. Large Market Cap is the market cap ($M) of issuers in the 90
th percentile 
(the largest companies). 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) second stage 
  ESB  E-Index  ESB  ESB 
         
Private Equity Backing  1.280 
(0.613) 
1.480 
(0.312) 
1.724 
(0.319) 
 
         
Venture Capital Backing  7.291
*** 
(0.000) 
7.707
*** 
(0.000) 
9.800
*** 
(0.000) 
5.306
*** 
(0.000) 
         
Industry M&A  1.007 
(0.140) 
1.008
** 
(0.034) 
1.010
* 
(0.052) 
1.002 
(0.456) 
         
Delaware  3.234
* 
(0.076) 
1.684 
(0.314) 
2.777 
(0.128) 
2.108
** 
(0.038) 
         
IPO Float  0.971
** 
(0.016) 
0.974
*** 
(0.002) 
0.970
** 
(0.014) 
0.983
** 
(0.018) 
         
Company Age  1.016
** 
(0.047) 
1.009 
(0.150) 
1.016
** 
(0.050) 
1.009
** 
(0.044) 
         
Market Cap  1.027 
(0.401) 
1.035 
(0.132) 
1.024 
(0.459) 
1.020 
(0.287) 
         
Large Market Cap  0.999
*** 
(0.006) 
1.000
* 
(0.051) 
0.999
*** 
(0.010) 
1.000
*** 
(0.009) 
         
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
Excludes firms backed 
by both VC & PE 
No  No  Yes  No 
N  235  235  222  235 
                                                 
§§§§ See supra Part II.C.3.   67 
Chi-squared  86.870
***  92.354
***  85.154
***  159.587
*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.280  0.151  0.288   
Reporting odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients); 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
 
The  results  of  Models  (1)  and  (2)  suggest  that  venture  capital  firms  take 
advantage of agency problems in order to maintain outsize influence on companies after 
taking  them  public.  While  they  give  up  many  of  their  easily  observable  contractual 
control  rights  at  an  IPO,  they  are  able  to  maintain  informal  non-contractual  control 
through board representation and takeover defenses, even as they sell off their shares.  
An alternative conclusion offered by others may be that venture capital funds may 
insist on having takeover defenses in order to cultivate a reputation for being friendly to 
entrepreneurs, as discussed in Part II.C.2. However, Bebchuk convincingly dismissed 
such  an  argument  because  funds  only  have  an  incentive  to  make  such  implicit 
commitments to managers if it would be expected to increase the joint surplus of the 
parties. Additionally, in interviews with fund managers,
***** reputational concerns with 
entrepreneurs were never offered as an explanation. Venture capital firms are typically 
known for exerting strong control rights from companies, not for giving up such rights. 
Finally, it is difficult to imagine that a manager of a start-up would actually have an ex 
ante opinion on whether or not the company should have a staggered board. Most start-up 
managers  are  not  repeat  players  in  the  IPO  market,  do  not  have  an  advanced 
understanding of the perceived pros and cons of takeover defenses, and presumably rely 
on their experienced agents (lawyers) and financial sponsors to deal with such matters. 
And, in interviews, executives at venture capital firms have confirmed this.
†††††  
It is notable—and rather surprising—that private equity backing does not have a 
statistically significant relationship with takeover defenses while venture capital backing 
does.  Both  venture  capital  and  private  equity  firms  are  active,  sophisticated,  and 
presumably well-informed participants in the IPO market. They have similar incentives to 
make decisions that maximize the value of shares in IPOs of portfolio companies. The 
funds of venture capital and private equity firms are of limited duration and have similar 
investment horizons. I did not expect the results of financial backing to be distinct based 
on whether it was a private equity or venture capital fund. This result also leads us to 
reject  the  idea  that  takeover  defenses  are  generally  optimal  for  pre-IPO  shareholders 
because, once again, the parties that presumably have the most IPO experience behave 
differently from one another. 
                                                 
***** Interviewees included a co-founder and principal at a Silicon Valley venture capital firm, a 
principal at a Boston-based venture capital firm, and a former managing partner at a large private equity 
firm that also runs venture capital funds. 
††††† Id.     68 
  However,  there  is  one  vital  disparity  in  the  experience  of  private  equity  and 
venture  capital  firms:  private  equity  firms  have  extensive  experience  in  the  public 
markets. While venture capital firms typically invest in private start-ups, private equity 
firms make many significant investments in public companies. Private equity firms have 
been involved in more than one-quarter of U.S. mergers in recent years.
‡‡‡‡‡ Note that 
over a third of my IPO sample involved companies undergoing RLBOs, all of which 
were public companies before being taken private by private equity firms. Because they 
operate  in  the  public  market,  private  equity  firms  have  first-hand  experience  with 
takeover defenses that insulate managers such as staggered boards. It is plausible that 
they are therefore more attuned to the negative effects associated with takeover defenses 
than venture capital firms that never have to deal with acquiring a public company. Even 
though private equity firms almost never engage in hostile transactions, it is not difficult 
to  imagine  that  they  have  seen  value-creating  LBO  transactions  scuttled  because 
entrenched managers hid behind takeover defenses. As experienced players in the public 
markets,  private  equity  firms  are  also  more  aware  of  the  significant  declassification 
trends in public companies and therefore know that annual elections are inevitable. 
  Even  though  I  reject  the  reputation-based  explanation,  I  cannot  discard  the 
possibility that issuer managers are more fungible—and less important to the value of the 
company—in  private  equity-backed  companies  than  in  venture-backed  firms.  Private 
equity firms are known for having a knack to restructure management teams.
§§§§§ The 
value of portfolio companies is likely not dependent on the fungible operational team that 
is in place at the IPO. On the other hand, the value of some start-ups and other companies 
backed  by  venture  funds  may  indeed  be  dependent  on  the  management  team.  In 
companies such as Facebook, it is clear that a significant amount of the firm’s value is 
tied to the management team. Managers like Mark Zuckerberg cannot easily be replaced. 
Thus,  it  is  possible  that  venture  capital  firms  may  find  it  desirable  to  insulate 
management  when  they  perceive  that  the  company’s  value  depends  on  the  specific 
management team in place.   
  Finally, there is some reason to believe that limited partners may have less 
influence on the practices of the general partners in venture capital funds than they do in 
private equity. Because of their smaller size,
****** venture capital funds are more likely to 
be oversubscribed. As a result, limited partners regularly claim that venture capital firms 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡ Katz, supra note ***********************, at 624. 
§§§§§ E.g., Stephan Schäli & Florian Demleitner, Understanding private equity’s outperformance in 
difficult  times ( P a r t n e r s  G r o u p  R e s e a r c h  F l a s h ,  J a n .  2 0 1 2 ) ,  available  at 
http://www.partnersgroup.com/display.cfm/id/100483/. 
******  See supra Part II.B.2.a for explanation of why venture capital funds are smaller.   69 
are often able to choose their investors.
†††††† Influential institutional investors may 
consequently choose to remain silent regarding their corporate governance beliefs and 
preferences in order to ensure access to these venture funds. 
                                                 
†††††† Berk A. Sensoy et al., Limited Partner Performance and the Maturing of the Private Equity 
Industry  8  (NBER  Working  Paper  No.  18793,  Feb.  2013),  available  at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18793.   70 
 
    a.  Addressing Endogeneity and Measurement Error. 
  There are two potential complications in these models that are worth discussing: 
endogeneity and measurement error inherent in the Venture Capital Backing and Private 
Equity Backing variables. Endogeneity is a concern because the selection of companies 
backed  by  venture  capital  and  private  equity  funds  may  not  be  exogenous  to 
characteristics of the companies. Measurement error may result from misclassification of 
venture capital and private equity firms. 
  As  discussed  in  Part  III.B,  I  attempted  to  minimize  measurement  error  when 
recording values for Venture Capital Backing and Private Equity Backing by relying on 
an  objective  third-party  source.  In  recent  years,  however,  there  has  been  some 
convergence  between  the  two  categories  of  investments  as  competition  for  deals  has 
heated  up.
‡‡‡‡‡‡ The  term  “private  equity”  has  increasingly  been  used  as  an  umbrella 
covering  both  traditional  private  equity  (LBO)  firms  and  venture  capital  firms.
§§§§§§ 
Additionally, many top private equity firms have begun to dip their toes into venture 
capital  investments.
******* This  concern  is  exhibited  by  the  thirteen  companies  in  the 
sample that were backed by both private equity and venture capital firms. For example, 
the private equity firm Summit Partners—which stresses the difference between private 
equity (growth equity) and venture capital
†††††††—launched a $520M venture capital fund 
(“Summit Partners Venture Capital Fund III”) in 2012.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Ultimately, I do not believe 
this affects the interpretation of the results.  The convergence seems to be unidirectional, 
as  venture  capital  firms  have  not  expanded  into  traditional  private  equity 
investments.
§§§§§§§  In interviews, executives at top firms that offer both private equity and 
venture  capital  funds,  including  Summit  Partners,  confessed  that  they  did  not  apply 
different management philosophies to portfolio companies in the different funds. The 
chief distinction was just the size and timing of their investment.  
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Nick Hazell & Simon Walker, Private equity and venture capital investors used to keep 
their work separate, but now, in a disrupted world of finance, things are set to change, REALBUSINESS, Jan. 
24,  2013,  http://realbusiness.co.uk/article/17331-can-private-equity-and-venture-capital-work-together.  In 
fact, Dow Jones & Co. even merged its private equity and venture capital databases into a single platform. 
See Private Equity & Venture Capital, DOW JONES, http://pevc.dowjones.com/. 
§§§§§§ See Pema  Levy,  The Media Is Confusing Private Equity And Venture Capital — To Mitt 
Romney’s Benefit, TALKINGPOINTSMEMO, Jan. 23, 2013, http://2012.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/01/the-
media-is-confusing-private-equity-and-venture-capital----to-mitt-romneys-benefit.php. 
*******  See Shira Ovide & Pui-Wing Tam, New Money Ventures to Silicon Valley, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 8, 2013. 
††††††† About  Our  Growth  Equity  Approach,  FAQ,  SUMMIT  PARTNERS, 
http://www.summitpartners.com/what-is-growth-equity.aspx, last accessed Mar. 29, 2013. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See Private equity database, Preqin (Mar. 29, 2013) (on file with author). 
§§§§§§§ See Dan Primack, Venture capitalists: We don't do private equity, FORTUNE, Jan. 20, 2012, 
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/01/20/venture-capitalists-we-dont-do-private-equity/.   71 
  I eliminate the thirteen companies with both private equity and venture capital 
backing  from  the  sample  in  Model  (3).  With  the  exception  of  Delaware, all  of  the 
exponentiated  coefficients  that  were  significant  in  Model  (1)  remain  statistically 
significant in Model (3). This model arguably removes some noise from the data. As a 
result, the odds ratio for Venture Capital Backing has increased to 9.8, indicating that 
venture-backed companies are almost ten times more likely to go public with an effective 
staggered board than other companies. This result implies that the measurement error, if 
it has any effect at all, causes us to underestimate the impact of venture capital backing 
on the incidence of takeover defenses. 
One  conceivable  difficulty  in  drawing  conclusions  from  Model  (1)  is  that  the 
selection  of  which  firms  venture  capital  and  private  equity  funds  invest  in  is  not 
exogenous to the characteristics of the firm and the CEO. As described by Baker and 
Gompers,  we  run  a  risk  of  falsely  imputing  a  significant  impact  of  venture  capital 
because  of  the  omission  of  unidentified  company  and  CEO  characteristics.
******** To 
address this, I employ a bivariate probit model to simultaneously estimate the likelihood 
that a company is backed by venture capital and the likelihood that the company has an 
effective  staggered  board.
†††††††† A  proper  model  uses  instrumental  variables  that  are 
strongly correlated with the presence of venture capital backing yet uncorrelated with 
other determinants of takeover defenses, both observed and unobserved.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Baker and 
Gompers identified two such instruments: (1) the state where the firm’s headquarters are 
located and (2) a dummy variable set to one if the firm was founded after 1979.
§§§§§§§§  
As the venture capital industry is concentrated in states such as California and as 
the  cost  of  monitoring  increases  in  proportion  to  the  distance  between  a  company’s 
headquarters  and  its  venture  capital  backers,  Baker  and  Gompers  argue  that  venture 
capital backing is related to the location of the company’s headquarters. Additionally, as 
the amendment to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) in 1979 
allowed pension funds to invest in venture capital partnerships and dramatically increased 
capital inflows to venture capital funds, they contend that companies founded after 1979 
have a higher probability of being backed by venture funds. Unfortunately, as 29 years 
have passed between the ERISA amendment and the first year of the sample, the ERISA 
dummy  variable  cannot  be  used  as  an  instrument.
********* Instead,  I  use  a  categorical 
variable set to one if a company is in a high-tech industry. High-tech companies are often 
                                                 
********  Baker & Gompers, supra note §§, at 579. 
†††††††† See GREENE, supra note ††††††††††††††††††††††††††††, at 738–39. For an example of a 
similar use of a bivariate probit model, see Yael V. Hochberg, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance 
in the Newly Public Firm, 16 REV. FIN. 429, 441 (2012) and Bates et al., supra note ††††††, at 673. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ See GREENE, supra note ††††††††††††††††††††††††††††, at 228. 
§§§§§§§§ Baker & Gompers, supra note ******, at 579. 
*********  The inclusion of this variable causes quasi-complete separation in any logit or probit model 
using the data sample.   72 
magnets for venture capital investors. The sample illustrates this relationship: 71% of 
venture-backed companies are in a high-tech industry while only 21% of non-venture 
companies are classified as high-tech. 
Model  (4)  has  two  stages  of  equations  that  are  simultaneously  estimated  by 
maximum likelihood regression. The first stage equation (unreported) is a model with 
Venture Capital Backing as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the 
categorical  variables  that  indicate  the  state  of  a  firm’s  headquarters  (CAHQ, MAHQ, 
NJHQ, NYHQ, and TXHQ) and a categorical variable set to 1 if the firm is in a high-tech 
industry (HIGHTECH). The second stage equation estimates the likelihood that there is 
an  effective  staggered  board  (ESB)  using  Venture  Capital  Backing  and  the  control 
variables used elsewhere. The direction and significance of the results of Model (4) are 
virtually  identical  to  Model  (1).  While  the  odds  ratio  for  Venture Capital Backing is 
slightly lower in this model, it is still remarkably high and statistically significant at the 
1%  level.  The  results  of  this  model  are  encouraging  as  they  suggest  that  the 
exponentiated coefficient (odds ratio) for Venture Capital Backing in Model (1) does not 
arise from endogeneity and is not merely the result of ex ante selection.  
3.  Management entrenchment models. 
 Table 14 presents multivariate regressions testing the Management Entrenchment 
hypothesis. Model (1) presents a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if an issuer has an effective staggered board (ESB) while 
Model (2) presents an ordered logistic regression in which the issuer’s E-Index is the 
dependent variable. 
In  both  models,  none  of  the  variables  representing  significant  non-pecuniary 
benefits  to  management  and  entrenchment  have  a  statistically  significant  relationship 
with  the  adoption  of  takeover  defenses.  The  presence  of  a  CEO-Founder,  a  CEO-
Chairman, the age of the CEO, and the pre-IPO inside ownership of the company are not 
associated with the adoption of takeover defenses.   73 
 
TABLE 14 
Management Entrenchment Hypothesis 
Models 1 is a logistic regression in which the dependent variable equals one if the issuer had an effective staggered 
board (ESB) when it went public. Model 2 is an ordered logistic regression in which the dependent variable equals the 
E-Index, ranging from 0 to 5, for the issuer when it went public. The sample consists of 236 initial public offerings 
issued between 2008 and 2012 for which there was no controlling dual class capital structure. The p-values are reported 
in parentheses. CEO-Founder is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also a founder of the issuer. CEO-
Chairman is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO also serves as chairman of the issuer’s board. CEO Age is the 
age of the CEO. Inside Ownership is the percent of the issuer’s common stock owned by directors and officers prior to 
the IPO. Industry M&A is the number of public M&A transactions that occurred in an issuer’s 3-digit SIC industry in 
the 3 years prior to the IPO. Delaware is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is incorporated in Delaware. IPO 
Float is the percentage of shares offered in an IPO. Company Age is the age of the issuer at its IPO. Market Cap is the 
market cap ($M) of the issuer up to the 90
th percentile before the IPO. Large Market Cap is the market cap ($M) of 
issuers in the 90
th percentile (the largest companies). 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ESB  E-Index  ESB 
       
CEO-Founder  1.420 
(0.373) 
1.458 
(0.230) 
3.083
* 
(0.082) 
       
CEO-Chairman  0.888 
(0.739) 
0.760 
(0.329) 
1.023 
(0.951) 
       
CEO Age  0.981 
(0.387) 
0.994 
(0.724) 
0.992 
(0.729) 
       
Inside Ownership  1.005 
(0.302) 
1.007 
(0.105) 
1.004 
(0.423) 
       
Private Equity Backing      1.910 
(0.263) 
       
CEO-Founder in PE-Backed Issuer      0.542 
(0.282) 
       
Venture Capital Backing      6.522
*** 
(0.002) 
       
Industry M&A  1.014
*** 
(0.002) 
1.015
*** 
(0.000) 
1.006 
(0.223) 
       
Delaware  6.335
*** 
(0.004) 
2.773
** 
(0.042) 
3.688
* 
(0.060) 
       
IPO Float  0.959
*** 
(0.001) 
0.966
*** 
(0.000) 
0.971
** 
(0.020) 
       
Company Age  1.017
** 
(0.048) 
1.006 
(0.343) 
1.018
** 
(0.031) 
       
Market Cap  1.035 
(0.264) 
1.047
** 
(0.048) 
1.030 
(0.374) 
       
Large Market Cap  0.999
*** 
(0.000) 
1.000
** 
(0.030) 
0.999
** 
(0.011) 
       
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Chi-squared  71.673
***  68.638
***  92.947
*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.233  0.113  0.302 
Reporting odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients); 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01     74 
 
Recall that the two previous influential studies of the management entrenchment 
and private benefits hypothesis reached conflicting conclusions. Field and Karpoff found 
that takeover defenses were more likely to be used by companies with weak controls over 
senior management, such as firms with a CEO-Chairman, younger CEOs, and smaller 
insider  holdings.
††††††††† On  the  other  hand,  Daines  and  Klausner  found  that  takeover 
defenses were more likely to be used when insiders had higher pre-IPO ownership and 
that the presence of a CEO-Founder had no correlation with takeover defenses. Although 
inconsistent  with  the  results  observed  by  Daines  and  Klausner,
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ my  results  are 
consistent  with  their  conclusion  to  reject  the  management  entrenchment  hypothesis. 
These results are not sensitive to changes in the model that account for multicollinearity 
between the independent variables of interest.
§§§§§§§§§ 
Interaction  variables  are  useful  when  the  effect  of  one  variable  on  another 
depends on a third variable.
********** As previously indicated in Table 9, the difference in 
the means of some of the management entrenchment variables, such as CEO-Founder, 
between the venture capital and the private equity subsamples is statistically significant. 
Therefore, in order to determine whether the relationship between the presence of a CEO-
Founder and the inclusion of an effective staggered board is dependent on whether the 
company is backed by a venture capital or private equity firm, I interacted CEO-Founder 
with  Private Equity Backing and  Venture Capital Backing.
†††††††††† However,  only  the 
interaction for the Private Equity Backing added explanatory power to the model and 
provided statistically significant results.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Model (3) supplements the management 
entrenchment variables with Private Equity Backing, Venture Capital Backing, and an 
interaction between CEO-Founder and Private Equity Backing.   
In Model (3), a non–private-equity-backed with a CEO-founder is three times 
more likely to have an effective staggered board than a company without a CEO-founder. 
This significant relationship does not persist in private equity backed companies, where 
there is no statistically significant relationship between the presence of a CEO-founder 
                                                 
††††††††† Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1871. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ They observed that takeover defenses were more protective when they were predicted to be 
the least efficient. However, my results show no relationship at all. 
§§§§§§§§§ CEO-Founder, CEO-Chairman, CEO Age, and Inside Ownership do not have a statistically 
significant coefficient if the other variables are eliminated from the model. Additionally, none of these 
variables has a significant correlation with another. 
**********  CINDY D. KAM & ROBERT J. FRANZESE, JR., MODELING AND INTERPRETING INTERACTIVE 
HYPOTHESES IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS: A REFRESHER AND SOME PRACTICAL ADVICE 18 (2005). 
†††††††††† In u n r e p o r t e d  m o d e l s ,  I  i n t e r a c t  t h e  o t h e r  m a n a g e m e n t  e n t r e n c h m e n t  v a r i a b l e s  w i t h  
private equity and venture capital backing. The interactions did not add explanatory power to the model and 
the coefficients were not statistically significant.  
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Because of this—and in order to ease the interpretation of the interaction terms in a binary 
logit model—the interaction of CEO-Founder and Venture Capital Backing was dropped from the model.   75 
and takeover defenses (0.542 odds ratio, p<0.282).
§§§§§§§§§§ The coefficients for the other 
management entrenchment variables and Private Equity Backing are still insignificant, 
and the coefficient for Venture Capital Backing is still high and highly significant (6.522, 
p<0.002). The effect of CEO-Founder on ESB lends some support to the management 
entrenchment  hypothesis  with  respect  to  non–private-equity-backed  issuers.  In  these 
issuers,  it  seems  likely  that  CEO-Founders  are  using  takeover  defenses  to  entrench 
themselves  in  order  to  protect  the  private  benefits  they  get  from  controlling  the 
companies they founded. Additionally, as this result does not persist in private equity 
backed companies, and as the coefficient for Private Equity Backing is not statistically 
significant,  the  results  add  some  credence  to  the  Substitute  Governance  hypothesis 
described by Bakers and Gompers.  
4.  Comprehensive models and dual class control model. 
Model (1) of Table 15 presents a logistic regression combining both the Law Firm 
and Venture Capital & Private Equity hypotheses. While Law Acquirer Deals loses its 
statistical  significance,  the  coefficient  for  Law  Target  Deals  remains  positive  and 
significant (p<0.083). Likewise, the odds ratio for Venture Capital Backing remains very 
high (5.7) and is significant  (p<0.003) and Private Equity Backing remains insignificant. 
As  an  increase  in  target-side  M&A  experience  for  an  issuer’s  legal  counsel  and  the 
presence of venture capital backing is associated with a higher probability of an issuer 
going public with an effective staggered board, these results lend additional support to the 
Law Firm Role and Private Benefits hypotheses. 
The  significance  of  the  relationship  between  Silicon  Valley  lawyers  and  the 
adoption of takeover defenses could not be tested in previous models because of the 
overlap between the use of Silicon Valley law firms and venture capital backing. Model 
(2) adds Silicon Valley Law to the Model (1). Its coefficient is not statistically significant, 
indicating that the use of a Silicon Valley law firm is not associated with an increased 
probability of an issuer going public with an effective staggered board. However, as 
discussed in Part IV.B.2, there is a rather strong correlation between Silicon Valley Law 
and Venture Capital (r = 0.49) that makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of each 
variable.  Nevertheless,  even  with  the  higher  standard  errors  possibly  caused  by 
multicollinearity, Venture Capital Backing remains highly significant and Law Target 
Deals  still  retains  some  statistical  significance.
                                                 
§§§§§§§§§§ The  odds  ratio  for  “CEO-Founder  in  PE-Backed  Issuer”  reported  in  Model  (3)  was 
estimated  in  accordance  with  Jokin  de  Irala-Estévez  &  Miguel  A.  Martínez,  Automatic estimation of 
interaction effects and their confidence intervals, 53 STATA TECHNICAL BULLETIN 29 (2000), http://stata-
press.com/journals/stbcontents/stb53.pdf. Odds ratios for models with interaction terms are not properly 
estimated  in  statistical  computer  packages  and  therefore r e q u i r e  a d d i t i o n a l  m a n u a l  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  See 
GREENE, supra note ††††††††††††††††††††††††††††, at 700 (explaining the difficulties associated with 
measuring effects in binary logit models with interaction terms).   76 
 
TABLE 15 
Comprehensive & Dual Class Control Models 
All models are logistic regressions  in  which  the  dependent  variable  equals  one  if  the  issuer  went  public  with  an 
effective staggered board. The sample in models (1)–(3) consists of 236 initial public offerings issued between 2008 
and 2012 for which there was no controlling dual class capital structure. The sample in model (4) consists of 250 initial 
public offerings during the same period. The p-values are reported in parentheses.  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Law Firm & 
VC/PE 
(ESB) 
+ Silicon 
Valley Law 
(ESB) 
+ Managerial 
Entrenchment 
(ESB) 
 
(Dual Class 
Control) 
         
Law Firm Variables:         
Law Target Deals  1.036
** 
(0.043) 
1.033
* 
(0.083) 
1.042
** 
(0.033) 
0.998 
(0.946) 
Law Acquirer Deals  0.975 
(0.226) 
0.978 
(0.283) 
0.972 
(0.203) 
1.011 
(0.759) 
Silicon Valley Law    1.583 
(0.441) 
1.594 
(0.454) 
0.755 
(0.678) 
Financial Sponsor Variables:         
Private Equity Backing  1.280 
(0.624) 
1.318 
(0.582) 
2.264 
(0.182) 
0.096
*** 
(0.005) 
Venture Capital Backing  6.393
*** 
(0.001) 
5.740
*** 
(0.003) 
5.267
*** 
(0.007) 
0.853 
(0.841) 
Management Variables:         
CEO-Founder   
 
 
 
3.487
* 
(0.058) 
1.649 
(0.376) 
CEO-Chairman   
 
 
 
1.076 
(0.849) 
1.278 
(0.642) 
CEO Age   
 
 
 
0.998 
(0.944) 
0.982 
(0.544) 
Inside Ownership   
 
 
 
1.005 
(0.409) 
1.000 
(0.985) 
CEO-Founder in PE-Backed 
Issuer 
    0.456 
(0.182) 
0.334 
(0.446) 
Control Variables         
Industry M&A  1.007 
(0.163) 
1.007 
(0.147) 
1.006 
(0.259) 
0.994 
(0.368 
Delaware  3.075
* 
(0.098) 
2.915 
(0.114) 
3.237
* 
(0.099) 
0.820 
(0.816) 
IPO Float  0.972
** 
(0.020) 
0.973
** 
(0.027) 
0.973
** 
(0.037) 
1.026
** 
(0.015) 
Company Age  1.015
* 
(0.075) 
1.015
* 
(0.073) 
1.017
** 
(0.050) 
1.005 
(0.648) 
Market Cap  1.025 
(0.444) 
1.024 
(0.455) 
1.029 
(0.382) 
1.000 
(.) 
Large Market Cap  0.999
*** 
(0.005) 
0.999
*** 
(0.006) 
0.999
** 
(0.011) 
1.000
* 
(0.070) 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Chi-squared  91.978
***  86.870
***  99.180
***  30.831
** 
Pseudo R
2  0.297  0.280  0.322  0.201   77 
Reporting odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients); 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01    78 
 
Model (3) incorporates the variables used in all of the hypotheses. In this model, I 
still find support for the Law Firm Role and VC Private Benefits hypotheses. And I still 
find  that  the  presence  of  a  CEO-founder  in  non–Private-Equity-backed  companies  is 
associated with a higher likelihood that an issuer has an effective staggered board. 
Model (4) displays a regression with DualClassControl as the dependent variable 
using  the  same  independent  variables  as  Model  (3),  which  combined  all  of  the 
hypotheses.  The  only  independent  variable  of  interest  with  a  statistically  significant 
exponentiated coefficient was Private Equity Backing, which indicated that PE-backed 
issuers are 1/10th as likely to go public with dual class control structures than non–PE-
backed  companies.  This  result  suggests  that  there  is  not  actually  an  efficiency-based 
reason for companies to go public with such takeover defenses. At least with respect to 
dual  class  control  stock  in  private  equity-backed  firms,  the  results  support  the 
Institutional  Investor  Efficiency  hypothesis.  In  unreported  regressions,  all  of  the 
hypotheses were individually tested using DualClassControl as the dependent variable to 
no avail. 
Sensitivity tests were performed in unreported regressions to ensure the accuracy 
of these results. The explanatory power of my models actually increases when I exclude 
RLBOs  and  spin-offs  from  the  sample.  However,  because  these  characteristics  are 
unrelated to issuer adoption of takeover defenses,
*********** it would be inappropriate to 
exclude these valuable observations. The use of probit models instead of logistic models 
also does not materially affect the results. Finally, I reproduced the models in random-
effects logistic regressions using the 48-industry group classification introduced by Fama 
and French.
†††††††††††  As the results were unaffected, I am confident that the reported 
results are not sensitive to changes in model specification. 
D.   Implications 
1.  Institutional investors should exercise their influence over general 
partners and reevaluate the separation of investing from governance. 
Pension funds, mutual funds, and other institutional investors that invest in private 
equity and venture capital funds need to reevaluate their performance of stewards of good 
corporate governance. They should not continue their inconsistent behavior. If they truly 
believe in their corporate governance policies and positions that they have staked out 
publicly,  such  as  their  opposition  to  takeover  market-insulating  devices  including 
                                                 
***********  See Field & Karpoff, supra note ******, at 1872. 
††††††††††† See generally Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Industry costs of equity, 43 J. FIN. 
ECON. 153 (1997).   79 
staggered boards, then they should assess whether they are complying with such policies 
when they allow others to manage their investments. 
A simple way that institutional investors such as pension funds can begin to fulfill 
this obligation is by informing the general partners of venture capital and private equity 
funds of their rationale for opposing takeover defenses such as staggered boards and of 
their expectations for general partners to take companies public in a manner consistent 
with good corporate governance. This does not entail that pension funds should actively 
participate in their external investments. All it necessitates is that they exercise their 
influence  with  respect  to  public  company  matters  in  a  consistent  matter  across  their 
portfolio.  At  a  minimum,  institutional  investors  should  include  matters  of  corporate 
governance  in  their  investing  criteria  or,  alternatively,  disclose  their  explanation  for 
investing in vehicles that do exactly what they publicly oppose. 
Mutual  funds  should  also  be  held  accountable  for  their  paradoxical  behavior. 
Unlike pension funds, mutual funds have no middleman to blame. They should reevaluate 
their separation of investing and governance functions and ensure that they involve the 
necessary  individuals  when  appropriate.  For  example,  they  should  ensure  that  their 
corporate  governance  personnel  are  aware  of  governance  arrangements  in  portfolio 
companies that are being taken public instead of only relying on such personnel in formal 
proxy  voting  situations.  And  if  they  believe  that  the  principles  in  their  proxy  voting 
policy should not apply to these IPO issuers, then they should at least disclose that fact 
and the rationale behind it.  
2.  Staggered boards should have sunset provisions. 
While the merits of takeover defenses for newly public firms can be debated, two 
things are certain. First, it is evident that the majority of IPO issuers go public with 
staggered boards and it cannot be said that doing so is always inefficient.  Second, public 
companies of all types and sizes are eliminating their staggered boards in response to 
almost-universal  investor  opposition  to  such  provisions.  Regardless  of  whether  ESBs 
might be optimal for a large number of issuers, it is clear that it is not optimal for these 
issuers to keep them in perpetuity. Therefore, issuers with ESBs should go public with 
provisions that phase out the staggered board or automatically put declassification up for 
a shareholder vote after a certain amount of time.  
Under the status quo, an expensive routine commonly plays itself out: Company X 
goes public with an ESB. A shareholder of X submits a precatory proposal calling for the 
board  to  declassify  itself.  ISS  and  institutional  investors  unanimously  support  the 
proposal. The proposal passes at the annual meeting. A year later, Company X puts a 
management  proposal  to  amend  the  charter  to  declassify  the  board  on  the  proxy   80 
statement. The proposal passes. Another year later, the directors up for election are only 
elected for a one-year term. And two years after that, the entire board is finally up for 
election on an annual basis. 
This customary dance is wasteful of both companies’ and shareholders’ resources, 
costing companies as much as $250,000.
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ Instead of repeating this charade, issuers 
that find it optimal to go public with an ESB should include a charter provision that 
automatically  phases  in  annual  elections  after  a  certain  period  of  time,  absent  a 
shareholder vote to retain an ESB. Professor Bebchuk suggested a similar solution in the 
past and concluded that the scarcity of such provisions was rooted in bounded attention 
problems.
§§§§§§§§§§§ While such provisions are indeed rare, they are not unheard of and 
were present in some of the charters of issuers backed by private equity firms in the 
sample.  As  discussed  earlier,  however,  these  charters  usually  phased-in  entrenching 
mechanisms rather than phasing them out.  
While  issuers  should  be  given  the  chance  to  do  this  on  their  own,  legislative 
intervention  may  prove  to  be  necessary.  On  one  hand,  issuers  can  arguably  capture 
additional  value  during  their  IPOs  if  they  have  built-in  sunset  provisions  for  their 
staggered boards. Recall that at least one study has found that positive abnormal returns 
were  observed  around  public  company  announcements  to  switch  to  annual 
elections.
************ Issuers will presumably be able to capture these returns in the form of 
a  slightly  higher  IPO  price.  On  the  other  hand,  the  bounded  attention  problems  that 
Bebchuk identified may inhibit the widespread adoption of such provisions. If that turns 
out  to  be  the  case,  then  the  Delaware  General  Assembly  should  consider  legislative 
intervention  that  still  preserves  issuer  choice  by  allowing  for  shareholder  votes  to 
eliminate an automatic sunset in order to preserve an ESB. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A large sample of firms that went public from 2008 to 2012 reveals that variation 
in IPO companies’ takeover defenses is largely determined by the reliance of two agents 
in  the  IPO  process:  lawyers  and  financial  sponsors.  Seventy-seven  percent  (77%)  of 
companies went public with either a classified board or a dual class capital structure 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ According to a 1997 questionnaire used by the SEC, companies estimated that the total 
direct cost (including internal costs, legal fees, and printing expenses) of including a shareholder proposal 
is $87,000. See Final Rule: Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 
34-40018,  63  Fed.  Reg.  29106,  29114  (May  28,  1998)  (codified  at  17  C.F.R.  pt.  240).  Adjusted  for 
inflation, the cost comes out to $123,595 in 2012. I assumed that this cost would be incurred twice: first for 
the shareholder proposal and then again for the subsequent management proposal. 
§§§§§§§§§§§ Bebchuk, supra note ***************, at 752–53. 
************  See supra note §§§§§§§§§ and accompanying text.   81 
where  insiders  retained  the  controlling  class  of  shares,  two  of  the  most  powerful 
antitakeover devices. While only 16% of companies the S&P 500 have classified boards, 
75% of companies in the sample went public with classified boards. The sample also 
illustrates  the  “ISS  Effect,”  a  significant  drop-off  in  the  rate  of  classification  for  the 
largest companies caused by anticipated pressure from institutional shareholders. 
I find strong empirical support for the theory that a law firm’s role in public M&A 
transactions—i.e. the number of transactions it represents acquirers or targets—affects 
the likelihood that its clients go public with takeover defenses in place. In every model, 
there was a statistically significant positive correlation between the number of M&A 
targets represented by an issuer’s legal counsel and the probability that the issuer adopts 
an ESB. I also find that a law firm’s overall proficiency in M&A no longer correlates 
with takeover defenses. The lack of a consensus amongst the most knowledgeable law 
firms regarding the adoption of takeover defenses prevents us from looking to them for 
an efficiency-based explanation of the variation in adoption. Instead, it indicates that 
anecdotal evidence and the framing of the issue within law firms help determine IPO 
legal advice on defenses. 
  There is also substantial evidence that financial sponsors such as private equity 
and venture capital funds play a significant role in whether their portfolio companies 
adopt takeover defenses. A staggering 90% of VC-backed companies went public with an 
ESB while only 51% of PE-backed companies did. PE-backed issuers tend to have some 
more  shareholder-friendly  charter  and  bylaw  provisions  such  as  those  allowing 
shareholders to act by written consent or call a special meeting than VC-backed have. 
However, this likely is not due to the goodness of the hearts of private equity sponsors; 
these provisions plausibly allow private equity firms to maintain their flexibility while 
they still hold shares. At the other end of the spectrum, 88% of VC-backed companies 
went  public  with  supermajority  requirements  to  amend  bylaws  that  work  to  insulate 
management from shareholders. A small number of PE-backed companies went public 
with charter provisions that were conditioned on the level of PE ownership. Most of these 
were not shareholder friendly; they merely gave veto rights to PE funds while they still 
held shares but leave shareholders out in the cold after the PE funds sell their positions.  
  There were some observable differences in the characteristics of companies taken 
public by venture capital and private equity firms. High tech companies accounted for 
around  72%  of  VC-backed  companies  while  only  accounting  for  21%  of  PE-backed 
companies. P E -backed  companies  were,  on  average,  twice  as  old  as  VC-backed 
companies. PE-backed issuers also had substantially more assets before the offering than 
VC-backed  companies,  although  VC-backed  companies  had  higher  market  caps,  on 
average.   82 
  After  controlling  for  the  characteristics  of  the  individual  companies,  venture 
capital backing still has a strong statistically significant relationship with the probability 
that  a  company  goes  public  with  an  ESB.  In  most  models,  venture  capital  backing 
increased the odds that a given IPO issuer had an ESB by over 700%. These results are 
consistent with the Private Benefits hypothesis, which predicted that financial sponsors 
would take companies public with takeover defenses in order to maintain private benefits 
of control at the expense of other shareholders. Venture capital firms typically give up 
most of their formal control rights at an IPO and likely use takeover defenses such as an 
ESB  to  insulate  the  company  so  that  the  venture  fund  can  exert  influence  that  is 
disproportionate to its decreased shareholders as they sell off their stakes. 
  Private  equity  backing,  however,  does  not  have  a  statistically  significant 
correlation with the presence of an ESB. Because private equity and venture capital funds 
are similarly structured and both are experienced players in the IPO market, this result 
was unexpected. A plausible explanation for the difference is that private equity firms 
have significantly more experience in the public markets (through transactions such as 
LBOs and PIPEs) than venture capital firms. They therefore are likely more aware of the 
negative consequences of takeover defenses such as ESBs and less likely to recommend 
such devices. Additionally, management teams may be more indispensable to firm value 
in VC-backed firms than in PE-backed firms. 
  If  private  equity-backed  issuers  and  venture  capital-backed  issuers  adopted 
takeover defenses at a similar rate, it would provide substantial evidence that takeover 
defenses  are  generally  optimal  for  newly  public  companies  (even  though  they  may 
destroy value later on in a public company’s life). However, my results indicate that it is 
no longer generally optimal for firms to go public with takeover defenses. On the other 
hand, one cannot discount the fact that a meaningful number of firms continue to go 
public with these devices. It would therefore be premature to conclude that it is always 
inefficient for an issuer to go public with takeover defenses. 
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APPENDIX A 
Selected Charter Provisions 
 
Company  Law Firm  Investor Name(s)  Investor Type 
RailAmerica Inc.  Skadden  Fortress Investment Group   Private Equity 
Subject to the rights, if any, of the holders of shares of Preferred Stock then outstanding, any director or the 
entire Board of Directors may be removed from office at any time, but only for cause and only by the affirmative 
vote of the holders of at least eighty percent (80%) of the voting power of the then issued and outstanding shares 
of capital stock of the Corporation entitled to vote in the election of directors (the “Voting 
Shares”), provided, however, that for so long as the Fortress Stockholders (as defined in Part (a) of Article 
ELEVENTH), collectively, beneficially own (as defined in Part (a) of Article ELEVENTH) at least forty percent 
(40%) of the then issued and outstanding Voting Shares, any director or the entire Board of Directors may be 
removed from office at any time, with or without cause, by the affirmative vote of the holders of at least a 
majority of the voting power of the issued and outstanding Voting Shares. The vacancy in the Board of Directors 
caused by any such removal shall be filled by the stockholders or, if not so filled, by the Board of Directors as 
provided in Part (f) of this Article FIFTH. 
 
Tower International Inc.  Lowenstein Sandler  Cerberus   Private Equity 
Prior to the 50% Trigger Date, any director may be designated for removal and removed from office at any time, 
with or without cause, by stockholders having the right to vote at least 50% in voting power of the outstanding 
Voting Stock, voting together as a single class. From and after the 50% Trigger Date, any director may be 
removed from office at any time, but only with cause and only if approved (1) by the affirmative vote of 
stockholders having the right to vote at least two-thirds (2/3) in voting power of the outstanding Voting Stock, 
voting together as a single class, or (2) if the Board of Directors recommends to the stockholders removal of a 
director for cause, by the affirmative vote of stockholders having the right to vote at least a majority in voting 
power of the outstanding Voting Stock, voting together as a single class. 
 
Graham Packaging Co.   Simpson Thacher   Blackstone  Private Equity 
Any or all of the directors (other than the directors elected by the holders of any series of Preferred Stock of the 
Corporation, voting separately as a series or together with one or more other such series, as the case may be) may 
be removed at any time either with or without cause by the affirmative vote of a majority in voting power of all 
outstanding shares of stock of the Corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, voting as a 
single class; provided, however, at any time when the Blackstone Entities are the beneficial owners, in the 
aggregate, of less than a majority but more than 10% in voting power of all outstanding shares of stock of the 
Corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, any such director or all such directors may be 
removed only for cause and only by the affirmative vote of at least 75% in voting power of all outstanding shares 
of stock of the Corporation entitled to vote generally in the election of directors, voting as a single class. For 
purposes of this Restated Certificate of Incorporation, the “beneficial owner” of shares shall be determined 
pursuant to Rule 13d-3 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. 
 
Cobalt International 
Energy 
Davis Polk   Carlyle/Riverstone; 
Goldman Sachs; First 
Reserve; KERN 
Private Equity 
From and after the Effective Date, except as otherwise provided in the terms of any series of Preferred Stock 
entitled to separately elect directors, the directors shall be divided into three classes, designated Class I, Class II 
and Class III.  Each class shall consist, as nearly as may be possible, of one-third of the total number of directors 
constituting the entire board of directors.  The Board of Directors is hereby authorized to assign members of the 
Board of Directors in office at the Effective Date to such classes.  Except as otherwise provided in the certificate 
of incorporation, each director shall serve for a term ending on the date of the third annual meeting of 
stockholders next following the annual meeting at which such director was elected. 
 “Effective Date” shall mean the first date on which the Sponsors and their affiliates no longer beneficially own 
more than 50% of the outstanding shares of Common Stock of the Corporation or the Corporation no longer 
qualifies as a “controlled company” under Section 303A of the New York Stock Exchange Listed Company 
Manual as in effect on December 15, 2009.”   84 
 “Sponsors” means Carlyle/Riverstone, Goldman Sachs, First Reserve and KERN. 
APPENDIX B 
Proxy Voting Policies for Select Mutual Funds and Pension Funds 
Fidelity (“FMR”):
†††††††††††† 
FMR will generally vote against a proposal to adopt or approve the adoption of an Anti-
Takeover Provision unless [specified conditions are met]. 
FMR will generally vote in favor of a proposal to eliminate an Anti-Takeover Provision 
unless: 
D. In the case of proposals to declassify a board of directors, FMR will generally vote 
against such a proposal if the issuer’s Articles of Incorporation or applicable statutes 
include a provision whereby a majority of directors may be removed at any time, with or 
without cause, by written consent, or other reasonable procedures, by a majority of 
shareholders entitled to vote for the election of directors. 
Vanguard:
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡ 
The funds will generally support proposals to declassify existing boards (whether 
proposed by management or shareholders) and will block efforts by companies to adopt 
classified board structures, in which only part of the board is elected each year. 
Alberta Investment Management Corp (“AIMCo”):
§§§§§§§§§§§§ 
A HIGH PERFORMANCE BOARD IS ACCOUNTABLE AND INDEPENDENT 
Guideline One: Facilitate shareholder democracy . . . . 
•  All directors should be up for election each year – board terms should not be 
staggered. 
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan:
************* 
We prefer the annual election of all directors. We will generally not support proposals 
that provide for staggered terms for board members. . . .  
We see many disadvantages with a classified system. Staggered terms for board member 
make it more problematic for shareholders to make fundamental changes to the 
composition and behaviour of boards, by making it extremely difficult for any challenge 
to, or change in, board control. In circumstances of deteriorating corporate performance, 
this difficulty could result in a permanent impairment of long-term shareholder value. 
                                                 
††††††††††††  FIDELITY,  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  AND  PROXY  GUIDELINES ( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  
http://personal.fidelity.com/myfidelity/InsideFidelity/InvestExpertise/governance.shtml. 
‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡‡  VANGUARD,  PROXY  VOTING  GUIDELINES ( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  
https://investor.vanguard.com/about/vanguards-proxy-voting-guidelines. 
§§§§§§§§§§§§ CANADIAN COALITION  FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, BUILDING HIGH PERFORMANCE BOARDS 7  
(2010), 
http://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/CCGG_Building_High_Performance_Boards_Final_March_2010.pdf. 
************* ONTARIO TEACHERS'  PENSION PLAN,  GOOD GOVERNANCE  IS GOOD BUSINESS:  CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE  PRINCIPLES  AND  PROXY  VOTING  GUIDELINES  26  (2013), 
http://www.otpp.com/documents/10179/20940/TeachersCorpGovE.pdf/cfca9682-9368-4cf4-96ce-fe5381d5647e.  